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The need for reconnaissance forces has been documented throughout history. 
Thus, the process for recruiting, assessing, and training Reconnaissance Marines should 
not be left to chance. The Marine Corps’ Basic Reconnaissance Course (BRC) is at the 
forefront of this process.  As identified by examining the data obtained from BRC, 
attrition rates have been nearly 50 percent over the last three years, illustrating there is 
room for improvement.   
This study conducts a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the criteria used to 
select candidates for the BRC. The research uses multi-variate logistic regression models 
and survival analysis to determine to what extent the current requirements to attend the 
Basic Reconnaissance Course are indicators of success. Using data from multiple cohorts 
of BRC students, this research develops a predictive model that allows the Marine Corps 
to more successfully recruit and train the most likely candidates to graduate BRC.  
The results of this study suggest that the Physical Fitness Test and General Test 
are the most significant predictors of success. The impacts of physical and cognitive 
capability on success are not surprising, but the magnitudes of these effects on the 
probability of graduating BRC provides commanders with survival percentages based on 
incremental changes in the prerequisites.   
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................1 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY ..............................................................................2 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS ..................................................................3 
D. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................3 
E. FINDINGS ..................................................................................................4 
1. PFT Score .......................................................................................7 
2. GT Score .........................................................................................8 
3. Land Navigation .............................................................................9 
F. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS..................................................................9 
II. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................11 
A. HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS RECONNAISSANCE ....................11 
B. HISTORY OF THE BASIC RECONNAISSANCE COURSE ............13 
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE BASIC RECONNAISSANCE 
COURSE ...................................................................................................15 
1. Mission Statement ........................................................................15 
2. Personal Selection ........................................................................17 
3. Phases of Training........................................................................20 
III. SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................23 
A. USMC RESEARCH.................................................................................23 
B. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES RESEARCH ............................................25 
C. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................28 
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................31 
A. DATA SOURCES ....................................................................................31 
1. Total Forces Data Warehouse.....................................................31 
2. Basic Reconnaissance Course .....................................................34 
B. DATA CLEANING AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION ................35 
1. TFDW Independent Variables....................................................36 
2. BRC Dependent and Independent Variables ............................41 
C. MERGING BRC AND TFDW DATA ...................................................44 
D. OMITTED OBSERVATIONS ...............................................................44 
E. DATA STATISTICS ................................................................................45 
1. Summary Statistics ......................................................................45 
2. Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................46 
 viii 
F. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................52 
1. Multivariate Regression ..............................................................52 
2. Survival Model .............................................................................54 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY ..........................................................................55 
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ..............................................................................57 
A. MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL ...................57 
1. Logistic Regression Model ..........................................................57 
2. Logistic Regression Model with Current Prerequisites ...........61 
3. Logistic Regression Model with Increased Prerequisites .........64 
4. Logistic Regression with Cohort Fixed Effects .........................67 
5. Summary .......................................................................................69 
B. SURVIVAL MODEL...............................................................................71 
6. PFT Score .....................................................................................73 
7. GT Score .......................................................................................76 
8. Previous Attempts ........................................................................77 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................81 
A. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................81 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.......................82 
1. Swim Qualification.......................................................................82 
2. Maintaining Data .........................................................................82 
3. Effects of Reconnaissance Contracts on Recruiting .................83 
4. Predicting Success Beyond BRC.................................................83 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................85 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................89 
  
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. PFT Score Survival and Hazard Results ......................................................8 
Figure 2. GT Score Survival and Hazard Results .......................................................9 
Figure 3. Requirements for Reconnaissance Marine Enlistment Option 
Program (Source: DOD, 2012) ..................................................................18 
Figure 4. PRO_CON Distribution .............................................................................47 
Figure 5. Age Distribution.........................................................................................47 
Figure 6. GCT_GT_TOTAL Distribution .................................................................48 
Figure 7. AFQT_SCORE Distribution ......................................................................48 
Figure 8. TIG Distribution.........................................................................................49 
Figure 9. TIS Distribution .........................................................................................49 
Figure 10. PFT_Score Distribution .............................................................................50 
Figure 11. CFT_SCORE Distribution .........................................................................50 
Figure 12. MANUF_TM Distribution .........................................................................51 
Figure 13. RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE Distribution ........................................................51 
Figure 14. COMBAT_DEP Distribution ....................................................................52 
Figure 15. PFT Score Survival Analysis Results ........................................................75 
Figure 16. PFT Score Hazard Analysis Results ..........................................................75 
Figure 17. GT Score Survival Analysis Results ..........................................................76 
Figure 18. GT Score Hazard Analysis Results ............................................................77 
Figure 19. Previous Attempts Survival Analysis Results............................................78 
Figure 20. Previous Attempts Hazard Analysis Results..............................................79 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1. Percentages of Attrition by Drop-Code .......................................................5 
Table 2. Percentages of Attrition by Training Day ....................................................5 
Table 3. Survival Analysis Results ............................................................................7 
Table 4. Background Characteristics/Variables. Adapted from Snyder (1993). .....24 
Table 5. Summary of Key Results & Implications. Source: Landale (2014). .........26 
Table 6. Definitions of variables in BRC_FY”Y”_MAIN files from TFDW. ........32 
Table 7. Definitions of variables in BRC_FY”Y”_MIL_SCHOOLS......................33 
Table 8. Definition of Variables in BRC Data. ........................................................34 
Table 9. Number of Observations by Fiscal Year from the Combined Data 
from TFDW and BRC. ...............................................................................35 
Table 10. Military Occupational Specialty by Occupational Fields. .........................37 
Table 11. Marine Corps Proficiency and Conduct Scale Definitions. Adapted 
from DOD (2008). .....................................................................................37 
Table 12. Definitions of Variable DROP_CODE. .....................................................42 
Table 13. Definition of Dummy Variables ................................................................44 
Table 14. Data Descriptive Statistics. ........................................................................46 
Table 15. Logistic Multivariate Regression MFX Results ........................................58 
Table 16. Logistic Multivariate Regression Results ..................................................61 
Table 17. Logistic Multivariate Regression MFX Results ........................................64 
Table 18. Logistic Regression MFX Results with Cohort FE ...................................68 
Table 19. Predictive Margins Results for PFT and GT Score ...................................70 
Table 20. Percentages of Attrition by Drop Code ......................................................71 
Table 21. Percentages of Attrition by Training Day ..................................................72 
Table 22. Survival Analysis Results ..........................................................................73 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AITB   Advance Infantry Training Battalion 
AFQT   Armed Forces Qualification Test 
ANGAU  Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit 
ARS   Amphibious Reconnaissance School 
ASVAB  Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery 
 
BDA   Battle Damage Assessment 
BRC   Basic Reconnaissance Course 
BRPC   Basic Reconnaissance Primer Course 
 
CNA   Center for Naval Analyses 
CFT   Combat Fitness Test 
CRRC   Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft 
CMC   Commandant of the Marine Corps 
CO   Commanding Officer 
 
DNF   Did Not Finish 
DOD   Department of Defense 
DOR   Drop on Request 
 
EDIPI   Electronic Data Interchange Personal Identifier 
 
FE   Fixed Effects 
FELO   Far East Liaison Office 
FMF   Fleet Marine Force 
FMFM   Fleet Marine Force Manuals 
FORECON  Force Reconnaissance 
FY   Fiscal Year 
 
GCT   General Classification Test 
GT   General Test 
 
HQMC  Headquarters Marine Corps 
 
LF   Landing Force 
 
M&RA  Manpower and Reserve Affairs  
MARADMIN  Marine Administrative Message 
MARSOC  United States Marine Corps Special Operations Command   
MCDP   Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 
MCO   Marine Corps Order 
MCRC   Marine Corps Recruiting Command 
 xiv 
MCRISS  Marine Corps Recruiting Information Support System 
MCRP   Marine Corps Reference Publication 
MCT   Marine Combat Training 
MCTFS  Marine Corps Total Force System 
MCTIMS  Marine Corps Training Information Management System 
MCWP  Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
METL   Mission Essential Task List 
MEU (SOC)  Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) 
MFX   Marginal Fixed Effects 
MOS   Military Occupational Specialty 
MSG   Marine Security Guard 
 
OTH   Over the Horizon 
 
PFT   Physical Fitness Test 
PMOS   Primary Military Occupational Specialty 
POI   Period of Instruction 
 
R&S   Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
RTC   Reconnaissance Training Company 
 
SARC   Special Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsman 
SERE   Survival-Evasion-Resistance-Escape 
SFAS   Special Forces Assessment and Selection 
SFQC   Special Forces Qualification Course 
SOI   School of Infantry 
SOP   Standard Operation Procedure 
SWCS   Special Warfare and Center School 
 
TABE   Test of Adult Basic Education  
TECOM  Training Education Command 
T&R   Training and Readiness 
TD   Training Day 
TFDW   Total Forces Data Warehouse 
TIG   Time in Grade 
TIS   Time in Service 
TTP   Tactics Techniques and Procedure 
TTUPAC  Troop Training Unit Pacific  
 
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command  
 




First, I would like to thank my wife, Gina, and our three sons, Jayden, Tyler, and 
Brady. They have been an unwavering support in all of my endeavors, often enduring 
tough situations without my physical presence. Their strength, patience, and 
unselfishness are the foundation for my success.  
I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Marigee Bacolod. She provided me 
with the resources to meet the challenges I have faced while writing this thesis. Her 
insightful guidance was crucial at every step along this journey. Dr. Bacolod’s ability to 
“torture” the data allowed the narrative of this research to take shape. Her wisdom 
extends beyond the walls of the classroom, and I will take these valuable insights with me 
as I continue this journey in life.  
I would also like to offer my deepest gratitude to the numerous mentors, peers, 
friends, and leaders I have had the privilege to know throughout the years. There are too 
many to list by name, but I will never forget any of them. I am nothing if not a reflection 
of what I have taken from time spent together in war and peace. I am forever in the debt 
of these many individuals and hope to be called upon if ever needed. 
The value of this life is not measured by accomplishments, but rather, the singular 
moments. I have been blessed with many cherished moments, and I am forever grateful. I 
dedicate this research to the Marines who set the standard before me, and to those who 
shall continue to raise the standard in the years to come. I offer my sincerest best wishes 
in this life and beyond.  
  
 xvi 




Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will 
usually be fleeting. To exploit them demands flexibility and speed. We 
must actively seek out gaps by continuous and aggressive reconnaissance. 
—United States Marine Corps, 1993 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Three general guidelines govern personnel and readiness issues within the Marine 
Corps. How do we recruit, train, and retain personnel? Over the years, several 
Commandants of the Marine Corps (CMCs) have identified the need for Marine 
reconnaissance units. There also exists a lingering issue: What policies should the Marine 
Corps implement to “fix recon”? Marine Administrative Messages (MARADMIN) 
0412/09 and MARADMIN 033/11 identify the need to fix manpower issues in the 
reconnaissance occupational specialty and highlight the fact that sustaining a 
reconnaissance capability is inherent to the Marine Corps’ success. However, the school 
that produces reconnaissance Marines, the Basic Reconnaissance Course (BRC), 
currently has one of the lowest graduation rates among Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS)-producing schools within the Department of Defense (Fuentes, 2015). Since 
2013, BRC’s graduation rate is approximately 57 percent. For example, BRC Class 4–11 
began with 53 candidates, and 13 of those candidates had already attempted BRC at least 
once. Twenty-four candidates failed the course, and only 23 candidates passed on their 
first attempt. Four years later, BRC Class 4–15 experienced similar results; 38 candidates 
began the course and only 21 passed. Of the 21 who passed, 17 passed on their first 
attempt.  According to MCRP 2–10A.6, Ground Reconnaissance Operations, 
the success of the individual ground reconnaissance Marine (MOS 
0321/0307) is essential to the success of the overall ground reconnaissance 
mission. Ground reconnaissance leaders and Marine Corps leadership 
must understand the psychological characteristics of those individuals 
most likely to succeed and thrive in the demanding and dangerous 
environments that typify ground reconnaissance training and operations. 
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2016, p. A-4) 
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This statement identifies the need for tough, realistic reconnaissance training, but 
it does not specify how the Marine Corps should implement policies to achieve sufficient 
manpower requirements for the Fleet Marine Force (FMF).  
The high attrition rate at BRC has a significant impact on fiscal resources. Ideally, 
I would examine the financial impacts from a managerial accounting perspective, but the 
Marine Corps Accounting System is not designed to support managerial accounting 
principles. Instead, the system identifies financial transactions to support general ledger 
information to create Marine Corps Financial Statements. I found the most relevant 
fiscal-budget data for my research in a FY2011 analysis conducted by Training 
Command Headquarters G5. The G5 analysis examined source documents and 
interviewed command financial personnel to help determine the cost incurred per period 
of instruction (POI). This report found the cost of direct material support for BRC (CID# 
M10AHK2) was $258,000 in FY2011. Using cost estimation techniques to adjust for 
inflation, I estimate that the cost per POI in Fiscal Year 2017 will be $278,000.      
Given this significant per POI cost of assessing and training a candidate in the 
reconnaissance trade, allocations of resources may be more effective and efficient if the 
reconnaissance community identifies a good recruitment match before arrival at BRC. 
Doing so would likely increase the probability that candidates succeed at BRC from the 
first training day.     
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
the criteria used to select candidates for the Marine Corps’ Basic Reconnaissance Course. 
Using data from multiple cohorts of BRC students, this research develops a predictive 
model that allows the Marine Corps to more successfully recruit and train the candidates 
who are most likely to complete the BRC. From a resources optimization and allocation 
standpoint, this knowledge increases the effectiveness and efficiency of BRC in a time of 
constrained resources. More specifically, the research addresses the following questions: 
1. Primary research question 
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 To what extent are the current requirements to attend the Basic 
Reconnaissance Course indicators of probable success? 
2. Secondary research questions 
 What determinants and hazards are statistically significant in the 
survivability of a potential BRC candidate?  
 Which point(s) during the course is a BRC candidate most probable to 
attrite? 
The benefit of this research results in a more probable successful candidate from 
Training-Day (TD) 1, minimizing attrition and increasing the overall graduation rate of 
each cohort. From a resources optimization and allocation standpoint, this knowledge 
will increase the overall effectiveness of BRC. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study focuses on the candidates that attended the Basic Reconnaissance 
Course from fiscal year (FY) 2013 through FY 2016. The scope of this study focuses on 
BRC and does not examine the data associated with the newly formed Basic 
Reconnaissance Primer Course (BRPC). A significant limitation of the analyses is Total 
Forces Data Warehouse (TFDW) maintains only data points for active duty Marine 
candidates. There are no data points prior to starting BRC for Navy Corpsmen in the 
Special Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsman (SARC) program, members of other U.S. 
services, or foreign military candidates.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
This study uses a two-pronged approach to examine the traits and characteristics 
of candidates that attend BRC. First, I estimate logistic regression models with the binary 
dependent variable of successful graduation (GRAD=1) as outcomes. There are four 
separate model estimates using STATA 13.1. The first model utilizes all the independent 
variables collected from the data to determine which, if any, factors significantly 
correlate with graduation. The second model focuses the analysis to categorical variables 
representing the current standards (Physical Fitness Test [PFT] score=225 and General 
Test [GT] score=105). The third model examines the impact of modifying the PFT score 
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requirement to 275 and the GT score to 115 while holding all other variables constant. 
All throughout the analysis, I report and discuss the marginal effects and not the 




 . Finally, I estimate and validate all three models with cohort 
fixed effects (FE). Adding cohort FEs to the estimation controls for any cohort-specific 
unobserved variables, such as peer effects, instructor cadre quality and turnover, seasonal 
patterns, and other unobserved variation specific to each cohort that impact their 
likelihood to graduate. 
Second, this research uses survival analysis to examine the uncensored 
observations, or those candidates who fail to graduate. Knowing that the time to complete 
BRC is 65 training days, I construct a duration variable and let T_Day=65 for candidates 
who do graduate while for those who do not graduate, T_Day<65 reflects the training day 
that the candidate attrits. Thus, T_Day reflects the length of time candidates survive at 
BRC, censored at 65 days. I estimate Cox proportional hazards regression models and 
relate the covariates with the duration of BRC candidate survival. 
E. FINDINGS 
The survival analysis provides the most significant findings. Tables 1 and 2 report 
the events and the days during the training cycle, respectively, that those candidates 
attrite. The significant events are DOR, which accounts for 27.08 percent of all 
candidates that attrite; land navigation, swim qualification, patrolling, and medical 
reasons are the other major contributing reasons for attrition.  Meanwhile, Table 2 depicts 
T-Day 10 (land navigation), T-Day 15 (swim qualification), T-Day 53 and 55 (patrolling) 
are the most significant days for attrition. 
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Table 1.   Percentages of Attrition by Drop-Code 
DROP_CODE Freq. Percent 
Academic (code-1) 13 2.12% 
Administrative (code-2) 4 0.65% 
DOR (code-3) 166 27.08% 
PFT (code-4) 38 6.20% 
Land Navigation (code-5) 86 14.03% 
Medical (code-6) 106 17.29% 
Patrolling (code-7) 46 7.50% 
Fin Time Failure (code-8) 18 2.94% 
Safety concern in pool (code-9) 25 4.08% 
Swim Qual (code-10) 65 10.60% 
Legal (code-11) 2 0.33% 
Individual Skills Test (code-13) 3 0.49% 
Integrity (code-14) 19 3.10% 
Knots Test (code-15) 22 3.59% 
Total 613 100.00% 
Table 2.   Percentages of Attrition by Training Day 
T_Day Freq. Percent 
0 94 13.93% 
1 32 4.74% 
2 26 3.85% 
3 26 3.85% 
4 19 2.81% 
5 14 2.07% 
6 25 3.70% 
7 14 2.07% 
8 14 2.07% 
9 8 1.19% 
10 100 14.81% 
11 8 1.19% 
12 13 1.93% 
13 21 3.11% 
14 24 3.56% 
15 48 7.11% 
16 24 3.56% 
17 12 1.78% 
 6 
T_Day Freq. Percent 
18 7 1.04% 
21 5 0.74% 
22 1 0.15% 
23 2 0.30% 
26 3 0.44% 
27 22 3.26% 
28 3 0.44% 
29 1 0.15% 
30 7 1.04% 
31 11 1.63% 
32 3 0.44% 
33 2 0.30% 
34 2 0.30% 
36 1 0.15% 
37 2 0.30% 
38 3 0.44% 
39 1 0.15% 
40 2 0.30% 
41 5 0.74% 
42 4 0.59% 
44 4 0.59% 
45 10 1.48% 
49 1 0.15% 
50 2 0.30% 
53 21 3.11% 
54 2 0.30% 
55 26 3.85% 
56-65 0 0.00% 












distance_PFT225 0.988433 0.002302 0.000 0.983931 0.992956 
RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE 1.001138 0.00119 0.339 0.998809 1.003472 
distance_GT105 0.980737 0.005461 0.000 0.970092 0.991499 
PRO_CON 1.106202 0.065391 0.088 0.985184 1.242085 
TIG 0.988333 0.006544 0.076 0.975591 1.001242 
AGE 0.977133 0.014236 0.112 0.949625 1.005438 
MARR 0.813985 0.109835 0.127 0.624827 1.060409 
COMBAT_DEP 1.288728 0.113272 0.004 1.084789 1.531007 
Some_College 0.902474 0.204144 0.650 0.57928 1.405985 
number_prev_attmpts 0.778788 0.069235 0.005 0.654255 0.927025 
 
1. PFT Score 
Physical fitness is significant in predicting success at BRC. Figure 1 uses the 
estimates from Table 3 to illustrate the significant role of PFT score in predicting the 
success of a given candidate. The graph represents the survivability of a given candidate 
holding all other variables constant with a 25-point incremental increase in PFT score. 
The lower bound is the minimum PFT (225) and the upper bound is a perfect PFT score 
(300). The model suggests there is a significant increase in the probability of a candidate 
graduating BRC with an increase in PFT score, holding all other variables constant. 
Interpreting the estimates in Table 3 further highlights the effect of predicting success 
with a change in the prerequisite PFT score during recruitment. The variable 
distance_PFT225 is each candidate’s raw PFT score minus 225, or is equal to “0” if the 
candidate has a score lower than 225. The hazard ratio states that for PFT score above 
225, a one point increase in the PFT score increases the probability of graduation by 
1.2% (100% - 98.84%) holding all other variables constant.   
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Figure 1.  PFT Score Survival and Hazard Results 
 
2. GT Score 
The results suggest that cognitive ability is second to physical attributes when 
predicting success at BRC, but also still is statistically significant. Figure 2 illustrates the 
significant role of GT score in predicting the success of a given candidate. The graph 
represents the survivability of a given candidate holding all other variables constant with 
a 10-point incremental increase in GT score from the current minimum score of 105. The 
lower bound is the minimum GT score (105) and the upper bound is a GT score of 135. 
The model suggests there is a significant increase in the probability of a given candidate 
graduating with every an increase in the GT score requirement, holding all other variables 
constant. Turning to Table 3, the hazard ratio states that for GT score above 105, a one 
point increase in the GT score increases the probability of graduating by about 2 percent 








Figure 2.  GT Score Survival and Hazard Results 
 
3. Land Navigation 
Figures 1 and 2 also highlight the significant, steep drop in candidate survivability 
on T-Day 10, when the training event is land navigation. This makes sense since land 
navigation requires the candidate to not only use cognitive skills to problem solve, but 
also requires the candidates to move over terrain, under load, while problem solving. 
F. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The research is analyzed over the following five chapters. Chapter II takes a 
deeper dive into the Marine Corps reconnaissance community, examining the history of 
reconnaissance and the Basic Reconnaissance Course. Chapter III analyzes previous 
scientific research applicable to this study. Chapter IV explains the data and lays the 
groundwork for the approach used in this study. Chapter V discusses the results of the 
predictive models and survivability model applicable to the Basic Reconnaissance 
Course. Finally, Chapter VI provides recommendations for future research.   
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This chapter provides background on the reconnaissance community from the 
early creation of amphibious reconnaissance doctrine, to the early development of forces 
prior to World War II. The history of Marine reconnaissance training is discussed 
beginning with the formation of informal training through the transition to formal training 
for the Marine Corps reconnaissance MOS. The third section provides a description of 
the BRC and its rigorous demands.  
A. HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS RECONNAISSANCE 
The genesis of Marine Corps reconnaissance occurs shortly after the turn of the 
century. Major Dion Williams first introduced the idea and necessity for staffing and 
equipping a reconnaissance unit in 1906. This force would enable Landing Force (LF) 
commanders to plan, sending an amphibious force ashore to gather information across the 
spectrum of reconnaissance, from hydrographic surveys to close reconnaissance of 
enemy disposition and strengths. Later, Major Dion Williams said that 
in order to prepare intelligent plans for the attack or defense of a harbor or 
bay, it is necessary to have at hand a comprehensive description of the 
hydrographic features and accurate charts showing the depths of water at 
all points, the reefs, rocks, shoals, and peculiar currents which constitute 
dangers to navigation, and the tributary streams and channels which may 
form avenues of attack or furnish anchorage for a portion of the floating 
defenses or auxiliaries of the defenders (p. 11). 
To comprehend the necessity of maintaining a healthy reconnaissance force 
within the Marine Corps, it is essential to examine the genesis of these elite warriors. The 
history of reconnaissance units within the Marine Corps begins with an identified 
requirement during World War II. During the “Island Hopping” campaign in the South 
Pacific, the requirement arose to provide a force that was capable of landing clandestinely 
on hostile beaches to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) that would be 
crucial to the landing force that followed. Due to the requirement and capability needed, 
the Marine Corps Raiders were founded. In 1943, this elite unit expanded and re-
designated as Amphibious Reconnaissance Company for the remainder of the war. 
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In Swift, Silent, and Deadly, Meyers (2004) notes that in Korea, Marine Corps 
reconnaissance units found themselves at the forefront of hostilities. Marine 
reconnaissance units were the eyes and ears of the Marine Corps as they battled on 
frozen, inhospitable terrain and were responsible for providing early warning and 
interdiction of North Korean People’s Army and later the Chinese Communist Forces. 
Meyers noted that with the introduction of the helicopter in the battlespace, 
reconnaissance units were able to penetrate deeper behind enemy lines and report to 
Combatant Commanders critical information about the terrain, enemy, and resources in 
the tactical area of operation (TAO).  
At the conclusion of the Korean War, Marine reconnaissance units were split and 
subsequently one unit was stationed on the West Coast (Camp Pendleton, California) and 
one on the East Coast (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina). These units found themselves 
generally undermanned and operating without much guidance until the Vietnam War 
began in 1965. 
As the Vietnam War escalated, the Marine Corps again recognized the benefits of 
having a force trained and capable of conducting reconnaissance of the battlespace. The 
pre-war years of insufficient funding and personnel manning gave way to an increased 
interest in providing a capability, but the cost for being unprepared was paid with the loss 
of lives. As the Vietnam War subsided and the Marine Corps returned to a peacetime 
force, reconnaissance units began to deteriorate once again.  
In 1985, the mission of the Marine Corps reconnaissance units was revived with 
the creation of the Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operation Capable (MEU-SOC). 
While other services collaborated to form the United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), the Marine Corps abstained, instead choosing to advertise its MEU (SOC) 
as a force in readiness capable of expeditionary special operations throughout the world.  
Marine reconnaissance units continued to play a pivotal role on the battlefields of 
the Persian Gulf War and into the Global War on Terrorism. They have been instrumental 
in the success of campaigns reaching from the arduous terrain of Afghanistan to the 
barren desert of Iraq and to intense urban fighting as seen in Fallujah. As the Marine 
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Corps continues to adapt, often time reconnaissance units have been the first to suffer 
from lack of qualified personnel and funding. Never was this more evident than in 2006 
when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld mandated the Marine Corps join 
USSOCOM (Smith, 2005). 
The personnel required to activate the Marine Corps Special Operations 
Command came from the reconnaissance community with the expectation that they 
would continue to provide a capability to the Marine Corps as the need arose. However, 
the years following have seen USSOCOM take sole ownership of these forces leaving the 
Marine Corps stripped of highly trained, capable Marines. Having a high attrition rate at 
BRC was once merely an accepted fact within the Marine Corps, but now this is proving 
to be detrimental to sustaining the force as the foreseeable future requirements demand 
the employment of small, highly trained units to combat our enemies across the world. 
According to an interview with Major General Fredrick Padilla (“MARSOC and recon,” 
2014) the rise of MARSOC complicates the effort to maintain the optimal manning levels 
in the Marine reconnaissance community. Furthermore, Major General Padilla recognizes 
the mission of making reconnaissance Marines is difficult, requiring significant time and 
resources.    
B. HISTORY OF THE BASIC RECONNAISSANCE COURSE 
Scholars and warriors have noted over the centuries, training for war demands 
acceptance that evaluation must occur  in realistically tough conditions to determine the 
merit of the individual and differentiate the courageous from the cowardly. Therefore, it 
should be no surprise that the men selected to perform the mission of reconnaissance 
within the Marine Corps must be specially selected and trained prior to reaching the Fleet 
Marine Force.  
The first documented Marine Corps amphibious training course appeared in 1943, 
as reported in a letter from First Lieutenant Frim to Major Richards (as cited in DOD, 
1989). The letter from Frim suggested that the Intelligence Section (D-2) founded the 
first Amphibious training course as result of the planned requirements foreshadowing the 
upcoming Island Hopping Campaign of the Pacific. In Australia, the Fifth Marine 
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Regiment conducted the eight-week reconnaissance course. The instructor cadre was a 
diverse group, consisting of U.S. Marines, Australians from the AIF, and natives assigned 
by the Far East Liaison Office (FELO) and Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit 
(ANGAU) (DOD, 1989). 
Early in the selection process of these newly trained reconnaissance Marines it 
was identified that these men should possess “superior mental and physical 
characteristics, swimming ability, and known courage” (DOD, 1989, p. 50). As 
acknowledged by Meyers (2004), Fleet Marine Force Pacific SOP 2–3 (1943) stated the 
type of training required to insure success of the given operation includes, but is not 
limited to physical fitness and swimming, stamina for long duration hikes, map reading 
and compass use, patrolling for long durations with minimum rations, sketching, use of 
cameras, hydrography, beach reports, small-rubber boat training, weapons, and 
explosives. 
The interim years between WWII and Korea saw little significant interest in 
developing and maintaining a professional reconnaissance force within the Division. 
Most training conducted appeared to have been on an ad-hoc basis depending on the 
personalities commanding those units. After the Korean War, we see resurgence in the 
interest to train and maintain a professional reconnaissance force within the Marine 
Corps. Meyers (2004) mentioned that in 1952 the Marine Corps established the 
Amphibious Reconnaissance School (ARS) of Troop Training Unit Pacific (TTUPAC). 
He stated that within a few years, the TTUPAC school was discontinued and once again 
the Marine Corps was left without a standalone institution to select, screen and train 
Marines in the skills required to conduct reconnaissance. Instead of formalized training, 
individual units within the individual divisions trained their own organic reconnaissance 
units.  
In the 1980s, reconnaissance training formalized with the establishment of the 
Basic Reconnaissance Course at Coronado, California, and the Amphibious 
Reconnaissance School (ARS) at Little Creek, Virginia. Though separated 
geographically, they shared a program of instruction in order to maintain an identical 
standard for producing a Reconnaissance Marines. However, due to decreased funding, 
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Training Education Command (TECOM) merged the schools into one reconnaissance 
school in 2007. The singular school responsible for training and re-designating Marines 
as Reconnaissance Marines is the Basic Reconnaissance Course located at the School of 
Infantry (SOI) West at Camp Pendleton, California. 
In 2002, Marine Administrative message (MARADMIN) 043/02 established the 
primary military occupation specialty (MOS) 0321, Marine Reconnaissance Man, for the 
ranks of Private through Master Gunnery Sergeant. This fundamentally changed the force 
structure and funding of the reconnaissance community within the Marine Corps. 
However, this has done little to curb the attrition rates at the Basic Reconnaissance 
Course, as Captain Jason Quinn states: 
You’ve got high attrition in BRC, coupled with casualties in combat and 
just the high turnover rate in our MOS of losing guys to MARSOC, losing 
[special amphibious recon] corpsmen to MARSOC, and guys just 
naturally getting out after a couple of deployments. (Fuentes, 2015, p.1) 
Today, BRC provides Marines with the skills to conduct amphibious entry, 
extraction, and beach reconnaissance. Reconnaissance Marines must be knowledgeable in 
operating and navigating the Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft (CRRC) in order to 
deploy forces from over the horizon (OTH) in support of amphibious operations.   
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE BASIC RECONNAISSANCE COURSE 
1. Mission Statement 
The mission of BRC is to produce Marines with the basic understanding of how to 
operate within the reconnaissance team. BRC is a 12-week course (65 training days) that 
trains reconnaissance Marine candidates in amphibious reconnaissance tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The desired outcome of BRC is for Marines to earn 
the Reconnaissance Man MOS (Military Occupational Specialty 0321). According to the 
Reconnaissance Training Company website, “BRC combines lectures, demonstrations, 
and practical application which emphasize individual and team land navigation, water 
survival, supporting arms, surveillance, patrolling, communications, amphibious 
operations and combat conditioning” (Reconnaissance Training Company, n.d.). 
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As stated in Marine Corps Order 3500.73, the following Mission Essential Task 
List is mandated: 
1. Plan, coordinate and conduct amphibious / ground reconnaissance and 
surveillance to observe, identify, collect, and report enemy activity, and 
collect other information of military significance. 
2. Conduct specialized reconnaissance. Assist in specialized engineer, NBC, 
radio, mobile and other unique reconnaissance missions. 
3. Conduct Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG) for helicopters, landing craft, 
and parachutist. 
4. Designate and engage selected targets with Force Fires and other 
operations to support battlespace shaping. This includes terminal guidance 
of precision-guided munitions. 
5. Conduct post-strike reconnaissance to determine and report battle damage 
(BDA) to a specific target or area. 
6. Conduct counter-reconnaissance. 
7. Conduct limited scale raids. 
8. Conduct insertion / extraction of reconnaissance forces in support of recon 
operations. 
9. Conduct other operations as directed by the supported commander.  
(DOD, 2004c) 
A graduate from the Basic Reconnaissance Course is capable of operating within 
a team to accomplish designated missions as guided by the METL, but to understand the 
individual skills required, NAVMC 1200.1A, the Military Occupation Specialty Manual 
states that the Reconnaissance Marine 
is an Infantry Marine skilled in amphibious reconnaissance and ground 
reconnaissance. In addition to basic infantry skills, he possesses 
proficiency in scout swimming, small boat operations and refined 
observation, scouting, patrolling, and long-range communication skills. 
Reconnaissance Men receive advanced training as Static Line and Military 
Freefall Parachutists and Jumpmasters, as well as Combatant Divers and 
Diving Supervisors. (DOD, 2015a) 
 
 17 
2. Personal Selection 
The training that students undergo while attending any of our courses is 
mentally and physically challenging by design. To be successful as a 
Reconnaissance Marine on the battlefield, it requires intellect, strength, 
endurance, skill and team work. As such, we are looking for individuals 
who possess the drive, discipline, maturity and courage to rise to the 
challenge and fill the ranks of these storied warrior communities. If 
successful, your remaining journey will increase in difficulty, but the 
sacrifices you will make and the hard work you will put forth will result in 
immeasurable reward. (Reconnaissance Training Company, n.d.) 
The prerequisites to attend BRC have changed minimally over the last twenty 
years. In 2002, the Marine Corps authorized any MOS to submit a lateral move request to 
attend BRC and transition to the Reconnaissance Man MOS. Previously, the Primary 
MOS of Reconnaissance Man had been limited to the Infantry (all 03xx MOSs). 
Essentially this directive increased the overall pool of candidates eligible to obtain this 
highly skilled MOS. 
Today, Marines that are eligible to apply for lateral move into the Reconnaissance 
Man MOS are: enlisted Marines in any MOS, pay grades E1 (Private) – E4 (Corporal) 
and officers from paygrade O1 (Second Lieutenant) – O3 (Captain). Enlisted Marines in 
paygrade E5 (Sergeant) are eligible if they have been a Sergeant for less than two years. 
Prior to assignment to the Reconnaissance Training Company (RTC), Marines that lateral 
move from MOSs outside the Infantry must complete the Basic Infantryman Course at 
the Marine Combat Training (MCT).  
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) recognizes that guaranteed enlisted 
reconnaissance contracts are beneficial to the Marine Corps as recruiting tool and 
increase the talent pool from which the reconnaissance community can select. 
Headquarters Marine Corps directs how Enlistment Option Programs would be 
implemented in Marine Corps Order 1130.53R (DOD, 2012). This order dictates the 
policy for recruiting Marines into all entry-level MOSs, including the Reconnaissance 
Man MOS. This order directs the minimum critical skills and technical skills needed to 
be eligible to obtain an Enlistment Option Program guaranteed contract. These incentives 
are tools for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) to meet the MOS needs of the 
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Marine Corps and the overall end strength goals as directed by Congress. Marine Corps 
Recruiting Command (MCRC) uses the Enlistment Option Program to offer job skill to 
highly attractive, qualified applicants in order to meet its accession mission. 
Figure 3.    Requirements for Reconnaissance Marine Enlistment Option 






MARADMIN 0412/09 states the additional requirements for current Marines to 
attend BRC: 
 Male 
 U.S. citizen 
 GT score of 105 or higher 
 WSB swim qualification 
 Score 225 or higher on PFT 
 Normal color vision. If a Marine cannot pass PIP or FALANT test for 
color vision he must be able to identify red and/or green as projected by 
the Ophthalmological projector or stereo vision testing (STV). 
 Visual acuity. Corrected vision must be correctable to 20/20 in one eye 
and 20/100 in the other eye within 8 diopters of plus or minus refractive 
error. Personnel who do not meet the visual acuity standards but who have 
a completed favorable refractive surgery consult conducted by a 
Department of Defense optometrist will be considered on a case-by case 
basis. 
 Security clearance. Must be eligible for a “Secret” clearance 
 Letter from command security manager is required with submission of 
Lateral Move request. 
 Respiratory health. Must be free of all upper respiratory problems and ear, 
nose, and skin disorders which might preclude a Marine from participating 
in prolonged training in salt water. 
 Musculoskeletal health. Must be free from injuries to the ankles, knees, 
back, and shoulders which might preclude participating in field training 
and normal physical fitness training. 
 Marine must be medically and physically qualified to participate in 
arduous physical activities and training. 
 Marines who do not meet Marine Corps Body Composition standards will 
not be considered for lateral move into MOS 0321. (DOD, 2009) 
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3. Phases of Training 
The current program of instruction (POI) for BRC is 65 days in length. It consists 
of three phases of training. 
 Phase 1: Provides candidates with the individual skills necessary to 
conduct reconnaissance.  
 Phase 2: Provides candidates with the individual and team amphibious 
skills required to conduct operations in an open ocean environment. 
 Phase 3: Provides the candidates with individual and team skills required 
to conduct reconnaissance patrolling operations and long-range 
communications. 
Phase one consists of individual training skills with a particular emphasis on 
physical strength and stamina. The physical evaluations consist of land-based and water-
based events. The land-based events include high-intensity physical training, movement 
over terrain with full combat equipment, including minimum weighted ruck packs, for 
time and score, obstacle courses, and day/night land navigation with time constraints. The 
water-based events include high-intensity pool exercises, water calisthenics, distance 
swim with fins and equipment in the pool and open-ocean, and water survival training. 
Additionally, candidates conduct hours of academic instruction throughout the training 
day on subjects ranging across the required basic, individual reconnaissance requirements 
as listed in the Training and Readiness Manual (DOD, 2004c).  
Phase two focuses on amphibious operations, in particular, the skills required to 
conduct maritime missions from OTH. During this phase, evaluation of the candidates 
occurs over numerous open ocean swims with fins and full combat load. Candidates are 
required to maintain a pace of 15 minutes per 500 yards over 2000 yards (one nautical 
mile) in the open ocean with full combat equipment. Candidates are required to 
demonstrate mastery of amphibious reconnaissance skills, boat operations, and nautical 
navigation from over the horizon using nautical charts and plotting boards with the aid of 
a compass.   
Phase three focuses on patrolling operations. In addition to continuing the 
aforementioned physical activities on both land and water, candidates are required to 
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demonstrate mastery of patrolling skills as listed in the Training and Readiness (T&R) 
Manual (DOD, 2004c). The culminating exercise is an extended patrolling operation 
during which time candidates conduct sequential full-mission profiles for evaluation.   
The BRC graduate is prepared to join a reconnaissance unit in the Fleet Marine 
Force. Once in the Fleet Marine Force, Reconnaissance Marines must attend specialized 
school within the Marine Corps and other service’s Special Operations Schools such as 
Survival-Evasion-Resistance-Escape (SERE) training, basic airborne school, military 
free-fall course, Jump Master training, Ranger Course, combatant diver course, and many 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 23 
III. SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review of relevant scientific research conducted in the 
past. The first section reviews research on the attributes used to create a predictive model 
for the successful completion of the Marine Security Guard School (MSG). While 
research on Marine Corps high-risk training is starting to gain traction in academia, the 
United States Army has conducted numerous studies on which attributes are most 
predictive of success in the Special Forces introduction training. The next two sections 
review research on the attributes and associated models determined to provide the Army 
Special Forces with a candidate most probable to succeed prior to selection. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of previous research and links how this study will expand the 
Marine Corps knowledge in this field.  
A. USMC RESEARCH 
The requirement and challenge of recruiting, selecting, training, and retaining is 
nothing new for the Marine Corps. This challenge is particularly difficult when 
determining which Marines should have the opportunity to further progress their training 
from the pool of available candidates during times of austerity and resource constraint. 
Despite attrition rates historically around 43 percent, no prior academic research 
examines BRC in particular. A USMC study closely related to this research is a study in 
1993 examining the Marine Corps Security Guard School.  
Building off previous research conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA), Marine Corps Captain Michael Snyder’s 1993 thesis develops a model to 
determine the predictors of success for Marines who attend the MSG School. While the 
CNA study focuses on attributes that predict success after graduation from MSG School, 
Snyder (1993) focuses on predicting graduation from MSG school using data collected 
prior to commencement of the school.  
Using data of 15 MSG classes from September 1989 to December 1991 
(n=1,794), Snyder (1993) defines success as graduation from MSG School. The 
following table lists the independent variables he examines in his research: 
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Table 4.   Background Characteristics/Variables. Adapted from Snyder (1993). 
Variable Variable Name in SAS 
Name NAME 
Grade PAYGRADE – E3, E4, E5 
SSN SSN 
Sex SEX – MALE, FEMALE 
Race RACE – WHITE, BLACK, HISPANIC 
Primary MOS PMOS 
Current Enlistment ENLIST, ENL2ND, ENL1ST2D 
Length of Enlistment LENENL 
Education Level EDUCLEV 
PFT Score PFTSCORE 
Rifle Score RIFLESCR 
Marital Status MARSTAT 
Ethnic Background ETHNIC 
Time in Service (TIS) TIS 
Time in Grade (TIG) TIG 
ASVAB Score GTVE, ELCIAR, MMMAPA, CL 
Current Age AGE 
Age Entered USMC AGEENTRY 
MSG School Class Average AVG 
Number of Dependents NODEPN 
 
Due to the dichotomous dependent variable of the desired model for his study, the 
author chose to estimate logistic regression models. Snyder (1993) finds that PFT, rifle, 
and GT scores are best suited to predict success at MSG School. In addition, age, grade, 
race, and TIG are statistically significant when holding all other variables constant.   
Of course, this model, in isolation, cannot determine the candidate most likely to 
successfully complete MSG School because this model does not include other 
unobserved factors such as grit and personality. More importantly, the model does not 
account for the recommendation from the candidate’s Commanding Officer (CO). 
However, if used in conjunction with the CO’s recommendation, this model can be useful 
in determining which candidate presents the best option when allocating resources to 
train the Marine for follow-on service prior to allocating resources.  
My research will extend the knowledge of predictive models used in conjunction 
with Marine Corps schools by analyzing the statistically significant determinants and 
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researching the points in time where these characteristics are instrumental in assessing 
when a candidate is likely to attrite.  
B. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES RESEARCH 
Given the inherent risks associated with sending small teams of highly trained 
Marines into uncertain, hostile environments, it is imperative that the Marine Corps 
selects the right personnel to perform these missions. The training is rigorous by design, 
and is such that the vast majority of the population need not apply for such professions. 
The attributes studied in the Army Special Forces parallel the desired attributes needed 
for success in Marine Corps reconnaissance with the exception of language training. So 
what are these attributes needed for success in such high-risk, mentally and physically 
demanding occupations?  
A study by Landale (2014) reviews accession and retention of Special Forces 
soldiers. As part of her study, Landale examines the predictors of success at the John F, 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). Landale uses the data from 23,070 
candidates from the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course during 2006 
through 2013. Only 9,371 (40.16%) of those candidates are selected for training in the 
Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). In addition to the 61 measures obtained 
during SFAS, the research uses three descriptive variables, including MOS, and one 
demographic variable (age) prior to attending SFAS/SFQC.  
Given the dichotomous dependent variable of the desired model for this study, 
where she codes success as STATDUM =1 and failure STATDUM=0, Landale (2014) 
estimates logistic regression models. Landale’s research examines twenty-three 
independent variables including ten variables for basic military descriptors of the 
candidate, six components from the principal component analysis of different training 
events, scores and traits, and seven dummy variables to account for unobserved changes 
over time. The multivariate regression analysis and survivability model determine which 
measurable attributes are relevant in predicting success throughout the observed time.  
The findings confirm the hypotheses, and Table 5 summarizes the results. 
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Table 5.   Summary of Key Results & Implications. Source: Landale (2014).  
 
 
The research I conduct is similar to Landale’s in that it seeks to determine which 
attributes are statistically significant in predicting success using multivariate regression 
analysis. Additionally, my study will determine at which point in the course a candidate 
with given attributes will access or attrite, providing a survivability model for incoming 
cohorts.  
Other researchers have examined the variables and attributes that affect 
candidates throughout training in SFAS and SFQC. One of these attributes is grit. Grit is 
the resilience to achieve long-term goals over time with sustained effort and perseverance 
(Duckworth, Peterson, Mathews, Keely, 2007). According to a review of literature, the 
grit trait is significant to obtaining education goals. Many experts identify grit as 
important in the success of an individual. The U.S. Army is the leader in conducting 
research on methods to measure grit in candidates for accession into military schools. 
The ability to “not quit” in the face of adversity is crucial to the success of any 
candidate. Throughout BRC, individuals face arduous demands, some unobtainable, and 
how the individual internalizes the conflict within oneself dictates whether the candidate 
overcomes his desire to quit. According to a study conducted on a cohort of Australian 
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Special Forces candidates, among the (51) applicants that did not finish (DNF) the 
course, the vast majority of them (34) that withdrew themselves from the course 
demonstrated a lack of grit or perseverance to overcome adversity (Gayton & Kehoe, 
2015). 
Can grit be used to predict success for reconnaissance Marines in the same 
manner as Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection? While appealing, grit is 
difficult to measure and often overlooked in quantitative analyses due to the inability to 
easily conduct a test and/or have a psychometrically validated instrument. There is little 
research on how to measure a candidate’s grit accurately. According to research 
conducted by several Special Forces around the world, surveys are the primary means of 
determining a candidate’s grit (Duckworth et al., 2007). However, it remains an open 
question whether grit measures are significant in predicting the success of any given 
candidate holding all other variables constant. Due to lack of conclusive evidence in 
accurately measuring grit, and more importantly, the lack of data surveying previous 
cohorts of BRC candidates on their grit, my research does not examine grit.   
The next attribute measured prior to selection to such schools is cognitive ability. 
The Marine Corps, much like its sister services, relies on tests which identify an 
individual’s cognitive ability. The Marine Corps uses the Armed Forces Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) score and the GT score to measure the cognitive ability of its 
members. The ASVAB test measure knowledge and ability in several areas including 
general science, math, word knowledge, mechanical and electronic comprehension, and 
verbal expressions. This test is not an IQ test, but rather a tool to measure knowledge and 
ability. The current pre-requisite GT score of 105 is the minimum, but other studies 
suggest this may not be the optimal requirement. The optimum score to balance 
successful graduation of Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection with manpower 
requirements is a GT score of 115 (Brooks & Zazanis, 1997). Due to the similarities in 
cognitive skills required to accomplish individual skillsets, both the Army Special Forces 
and Marine Corps Reconnaissance attempt to recruit, train, and retain similar personnel. 
Research suggests that tools to measure intellectual ability, such as the ASVAB, 
should include other non-cognitive measures. This will enable a model to predict military 
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performance in school environments to be more accurate, reducing the standard error 
(Driskell, Hogan, Salas, Hoskin, 1994). 
The role of cognitive ability is even more important when a candidate faces 
physically demanding tasks due to the necessity to be able to think, judge, and adapt in 
order to complete Special Forces Selection and Assessment. In his findings, Beal (2010) 
reports that the test that is most probable to predict cognitive ability accurately in Special 
Forces candidates is the Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE). The ability of cognitive 
measures to predict success is actually greater than the measure of perseverance. 
The importance of physical ability cannot go understated in any research 
involving predicting success among candidates that undergo arduous, grueling training 
over a significant duration. The physical demands of BRC are extremely high, and it is 
crucial that any prospective candidate possess a high physical endurance in order to 
decrease the likelihood of an injury preventing the candidate for graduating. In a study 
conducted in 2013 suggests that personnel who begin training without having the 
required level of physical stamina and endurance are at a greater risk of sustaining an 
injury and are more likely to attrite (Hunt, Orr, Billing, 2013).  
The physical demand of BRC divides into events on the land and water. The 
current requirement to obtain Water Survival Basic prior to attending BRC is inefficient 
in predicting success. The current requirement is similar to the minimum requirement to 
graduate Recruit Training; therefore, technically, every Marine currently serving has 
obtained the minimum standard. The current standard does not sufficiently establish the 
guidelines that enable differentiation among prospective candidates.  
C. SUMMARY 
In summary, prior academic literature points to cognitive ability, physical ability, 
and to some extent, grit or perseverance, as likely predictors of success at an MOS 
producing school like BRC. The predictive model I will develop in the next chapter uses 
all available information on BRC cohorts. This analysis and the survivability model will 
enable the Marine Corps to structure/restructure the POI to better select, screen, and train 
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the most highly talented candidates, and possibly (re)organize the training more 
efficiently to produce Marines for the specialty of reconnaissance.  
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This report is quantitative and requires bringing together several data sources for a 
given candidate.   The purpose of this chapter is to discuss each data source and how the 
population of BRC candidates is constructed, their data and variables cleaned and coded 
to enable statistical analyses using the software STATA. Next, I describe the empirical 
approach and statistical models I use in the analyses.   
A. DATA SOURCES 
1. Total Forces Data Warehouse  
The data for this research comes from two sources. The first source is the TFDW. 
TFDW consolidates personnel data from accession to separation for the Marine Corps. 
Information in the TFDW actually comes from a range of sources, but for my research, I 
use the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS), the Marine Corps Training 
Information Management System (MCTIMS), and the Marine Corps Recruiting 
Information Support System (MCRISS). The data at TFDW is a monthly snapshot of a 
Marine taken on the last day of each month. TFDW data in this study is thus drawn from 
the month prior to a given candidate’s BRC convene date.   
Each candidate has a unique identifier and matches to other data sources by either 
social security number or Department of Defense Identification Number (EDIPI). Next, I 
verify each candidate did in fact populate in MCTIMS as having attended BRC.             






Table 6.   Definitions of variables in BRC_FY”Y”_MAIN files from TFDW. 
Variable Name Variable Description 
RANK Current rank 
L_NAME Last name 
F_NAME First name 
MI Middle initial 
SSN Social security number 
EDIPI Department of Defense ID 
CLASS BRC class attended 
GCT_GT_TOTAL GT score for enlisted, GCT score for commissioned officer 
AFQT_SCORE Armed Forces Qualification Test  
AR ASVAB subtests Arithmetic Reasoning 
CS ASVAB subtests Coding Speed 
EI ASVAB subtests Electronic Information 
GS ASVAB subtests General Science 
MC ASVAB subtests Mechanical Comprehension 
MK ASVAB subtests Mathematics Knowledge 
PC ASVAB subtests Paragraph Comprehension 
VE ASVAB subtests Sum of Word Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension 
WK ASVAB subtests Word Knowledge 
PFT_SCORE Physical Fitness Test (PFT) total score 
PFT_PULL_UP PFT pull-up score 
PFT_RUN_TM PFT run time 
CFT_SCORE Combat Fitness Test (CFT) total score 
MTC_TM CFT Movement to Contact time 
MANUF_TM CFT Maneuver time 
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Variable Name Variable Description 
RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE Rifle Qualification Score 
COMBAT_DEP Number of previous Combat Deployments 
ETHNICITY As reported by the candidate 
PROMO_DATE Date promoted to current rank 
PEBD Pay Entry Base Date, the day the candidate assessed into the Marine Corps 
PMOS Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS) 
MARR Identifies if the candidate is married 
Table 7.   Definitions of variables in BRC_FY”Y”_MIL_SCHOOLS 
Variable Name Variable Description 
RANK Current rank 
L_NAME Last name 
F_NAME First name 
MI Middle initial 
SSN Social security number 
EDIPI Department of Defense ID 
CLASS BRC class attended 
SCHOOL_CODE Code uniquely identifies the school 
SCHOOL_NAME Name of school attended 
SCHOOL_STATUS Identifies whether or not the candidate completed the school 
SCHOOL_DT Date school was attended 
SCHOOL_STATUS Identifies whether or not the candidate completed the school 
SCHOOL_DT Date school was attended 
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A limitation of the data from TFDW is that it does not provide data points for 
service members from other branches of the Department of Defense (Navy, Army, and 
Airforce) or foreign military personnel. I retain these observations in the data set for 
further analyses, as dropping these observations would bias the analysis and create 
missing indicators.     
2. Basic Reconnaissance Course 
The staff at BRC provides the second source of data for this research. The data 
includes Excel spreadsheets reflecting each candidate’s records of performance 
throughout the course at individual events, as well as individual counseling sheets for 
candidates who fail an event. While the BRC cadre is very experienced in training 
reconnaissance Marines, the fidelity of the data varies over time. In addition to the 
information in counseling documents, Table 8 depicts the variables this study uses from 
BRC.   
Table 8.   Definition of Variables in BRC Data. 
Variable Name Variable Description 
RANK Current rank 
L_NAME Last name 
F_NAME First name 
MI Middle initial 
SSN Social security number 
EDIPI Department of Defense ID 
CLASS BRC class attended 
GRAD Binary indicator of whether or not candidate graduated BRC 
T-Day The training day identified if a candidate dropped from 
training 
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Variable Name Variable Description 
PHASE_ATTRITE Identifies which phase a candidate dropped from training 
NUMBER_PREV_ATTEMPTS Identifies the number of previous attempts to pass BRC 
REASON_ATTRITE Identifies the reason the candidate did not complete BRC 
 
Table 9 reflects the sum total of observations from BRC and TFDW by fiscal 
year.  
Table 9.   Number of Observations by Fiscal Year from the Combined Data from 
TFDW and BRC.     







B. DATA CLEANING AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
This section discusses the techniques I use to clean the data and construct 
variables. On more than one occasion, it was necessary to examine individual data points 
in order to determine accurately what the data represents. The merging of the two data 
sets (BRC and TFDW) requires extensive work and attention paid to particular details. 
The following section details the construction of variables I use for the subsequent 
analyses. 
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1. TFDW Independent Variables 
a. Personal and Demographic Information 
First, the naming convention in the data from TFDW is different from that at 
BRC. I make variable names uniform, as well as the entries in the variables itself, such as 
characters (e.g., spaces and hyphens) in individuals’ last or first name or middle initial. 
Next, I create dummy or indicator variables to capture the ethnicity of each candidate as 
BLACK or HISPANIC. Candidate age derives from the date of birth variable (DOB) in 
TFDW, and is a candidate’s age (in years) as of the first day of BRC. To determine how 
long a candidate has been in his current rank, I create a Time in Grade variable using the 
present rank date and the convene date (DOC) for BRC. 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 (𝑇𝐼𝐺) = ((𝐷𝑂𝐶 − 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸) ∗ 12)/356 
Similarly, I calculate time in service (TIS) as: 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝑇𝐼𝑆) = ((𝐷𝑂𝐶 − 𝑃𝐸𝐵𝐷) ∗ 12)/356 
b. Military Occupation Specialty (MOS)  
The occupational fields each candidate originates from prior to attending BRC 
may be a relevant factor in determining survivability at BRC. To make the analysis 
tractable, I identify certain fields in the TFDW variable PRIMARY_MOS_CODE. 
According to the MOS Manual, all basic MOSs are easily identifiable with the last four 
numbers in the MOS code as “00.”  With this information, I generate a code to create a 
BASIC_MOS if the last two numbers in the MOS code were in fact “00.” Based on the 
MOS manual, I generate the occupational fields of each observation (OccFlds) based on 
the first two numbers in the MOS code. Next, I capture the OccFld and generate three 
subcategories to reflect the origin of each candidate. Table 10 annotates the occupational 
specialty fields. 
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Table 10.   Military Occupational Specialty by Occupational Fields. 
Marine Corps Military 
Occupational Specialty 
(MOS) Category 
MOS Category Variable 
Name 
Associated MOSs from 
the data sets 
Air Support OccFld_Air_Support 6000,6100,6500,6600 








c. Enlisted/Commissioned Officer 
In order to determine if the observation is an Enlisted Marine or a Commissioned 
Officer, I generate a code to capture those Ranks associated with Commissioned Officers 
(2NDLT, 1STLT, CAPT, MAJ) and assign them as ENLISTED=0. 
d. Marital Status 
I code a candidate as married if the TFDW variable reflecting marital status as of 
the month prior to attending BRC is equal to an “M.” 
e. Proficiency and Conduct Marks 
For enlisted Marines the Marine Corps codes proficiency and conduct marks from 
a range of 0.0 – 5.0 with the following explanations: 
Table 11.   Marine Corps Proficiency and Conduct Scale Definitions. Adapted 
from DOD (2008). 
Score Corresponding Adjective 
0.0 to 1.9 Unacceptable 
2.0 to 2.9 Unsatisfactory 
3.0 to 3.9 Below average 
4.0 to 4.4 Average 
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Score Corresponding Adjective 
4.5 to 4.8 Excellent 
4.9 to 5.0 Outstanding 
 
However, the proficiency and conduct marks for enlisted Marines in this 
research’s analysis sample are highly collinear (rho=.99). To avoid a problem of 
collinearity in later analysis, I combined pro and con marks to construct the PRO_CON 
variable: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑂𝑁 = (
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑇 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸 + 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑌 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸
2
) ∗ .1 
This variable is multiplied by 0.1 because the data from TFDW does not contain 
the decimal point noted on Table 11. 
Of the three proficiency and conduct scores made available by TFDW (in current 
rank, average during current enlistment, or average over entire service), I determine the 
best reflection of an observation’s true conduct and proficiency marks prior to attending 
BRC is the average in service. The issue with using average current enlistment is that 
there are observations with more than one enlistment and others with less than one 
enlistment complete. The average proficiency and conduct score for current rank are over 
a shorter period, and I determine it to be a less complete reflection of the true 
performance of an enlisted candidate.     
f. Navy/Marine Corps Candidate 
Since the data from TFDW does not contain information for Navy personnel, I 
create a dummy variable NAVY to capture those candidates that were in the Navy based 
on their rank. I generate code variable NAVY=1 for a subset of individuals without data 
in TFDW with Navy ranks. All other observations code as “0” and therefore not Navy.   
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g. Cognitive Ability 
The standard approach across the Department of Defense to measure a service 
member’s cognitive ability is performance on the ASVAB test. The GT score is a 
combination of subtests. The GT score differs from service to service. In the Marine 
Corps, GT is a metric that sums the subtest of word knowledge and paragraph 
comprehension and arithmetic reasoning. This measurement reflects the candidate’s 
potential cognitive ability and suitability for MOS selection. For this model, Table 4 
defines the subtests. I discard the subtests variables from the TFDW dataset due to 
collinearity (rho>=74.8) with their respective tests. I create a variable to analyze 
candidates that score 105 on the GT with the variable GCT_GT_TOTAL_gt105 as 
baseline. I also create a variable for candidates that score 115 on the GT 
(GCT_GT_TOTAL_gt115). In my analyses, I compare and contrast the effects of these 
two metrics on the predicted outcome of candidates. The Marine Corps uses the General 
Classification Test (GCT) instead of the ASVAB for commissioned officers. However, 
according to Marine Corps Oder 1230.5C, the GCT is not for officer placement or 
selection to an MOS. For my study, I aggregate the two in order to determine if GCT is a 
predictor of cognitive ability for the Commissioned Officers that attend BRC.   
h. Physical Fitness Test (PFT)/Combat Fitness Test (CFT) 
Raw scores on the physical fitness test or PFT (PFT_SCORE) and combat fitness 
test or CFT (CFT_SCORE) are also included in the analyses. Additionally, I examine the 
run time (PFT_RUN_TM) and number of pullups (PFT_PULL_UP), but not the number 
of sit-ups because there is not enough variation. The same holds true for the ammo can 
lift portion of the CFT. For the CFT, I keep the maneuver under fire (MANUF_TM) and 
movement to contact (MTC_TM) times for use in the analyses.    These scores are the 
more recent recorded scores in MCTIMS prior to the candidate’s convene date at BRC.     
i. Education  
TFDW data contains several variables to record an individual’s education level. 
After a thorough analysis of the variables, I combine civilian education and civilian 
education certificate. I create a dummy variable (HSonly) to capture those who obtain a 
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civilian education of “12” years or a civilian education certificate of “GED” or “HS 
DIPL.”  I then generate a dummy variable (Some_College) to capture those who obtain 
the civilian education “college” or the civilian education certification of “1 SEM COL” 
or “ASSOC DEG.”  
j. Military School Experience 
 The data from TFDW contains all the information regarding who attended what 
schools, when they attended them, and if they completed the course. For the purpose of 
this research, I recode the existing SCHOOL_CODE variable with the corresponding 
codes (1-5): 
1. Defines basic schools as schools that will generate a MOS upon successful 
completion. 
2. Defines sustainment schools as schools that enhance the mission readiness 
of the individual within the MOS. 
3. Defines advance schools as schools that provide the Marine with advance 
MOS training and are usually required to hold key billets within the 
occupational specialty. 
4. Professional Military Education (PME) is schools that are required for 
promotion within a given MOS. 
5. BRC Primer Course (BRPC) indicates if the candidate attended BRPC 
prior to attending BRC. 
k. Combat Deployments 
The variable reflecting the number of combat deployments (COMBAT_DEP) is 
in the TFDW data. The numeric values reflect how many combat deployments a 
candidate completes prior to attending BRC. I replace candidates with missing combat 
deployment information in TFDW (.) with the numeric value of zero (0) and construct a 
missing dummy variable. 
l. Categorical Variables 
After creating continuous variables, analyses determines multi-collinearity exists 
and low variations with few statistically significant variables are present. The statistically 
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significant variables provide a low magnitude of economic significance. As a result, I 
create categorical variables for analyses. 
(1) Physical Fitness      
I create two categorical variables to measure physical fitness using PFT score. 
The first variable I construct categorizes PFT scores using the current prerequisite of 225 
(PFT_gt225). The second variable constructs PFT scores using the former standard for 
selection and assessment into FORECON. The minimum PFT score was 275 out of 300 
for enlisted Marines. Therefore, I create the variable PFT_gt275 to identify the threshold 
of candidates scoring less than or greater than 275 on the PFT. In my analysis, I use 
maneuver under fire because CFT scores present minimum variation. I construct the 
variable MANUF_less210 to capture the candidates that scored a perfect score on this 
CFT subtest.   
(2) Cognitive Ability 
I create two categorical variables to measure cognitive ability. The first is 
GCT_GT_TOTAL_gt105. This variable identifies candidates that score the minimum GT 
score as identified in the prerequisites. The second variable (GCT_GT_TOTAL_gt115) 
adjusts the threshold to the minimum score of 115 for comparison. A score of 115 is the 
optimum score to balance quality and quantity for selection into Army SF (Brooks & 
Zazanis, 1997). After analyzing the data, the threshold for the AFQT is determined to be 
90 (AFQT_gt90). 
2. BRC Dependent and Independent Variables 
a. Graduation from BRC 
The main dependent variable I use in this research is a binary (0/1) indicator equal 
to (1) if the candidate completes BRC and (0) otherwise. The variable (GRAD) is 
consistent in both the BRC and TFDW data. 
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b. Training Day 
As outlined earlier, data from BRC includes spreadsheets with individual event 
scores and individual counselling forms for students that fail to meet graduation criteria 
at a point in time during the course. Using the spreadsheets and counselling forms, I am 
able to identify which training day a candidate drops from training. The variable training 
day (T_Day) captures the date the individual drops from BRC. T_Day is the dependent 
variable I use to define duration in the survival models in the next chapter. 
c. Phase Attrite 
BRC data contains detailed training schedules. I use the detailed training schedule 
to annotate which phase (phase 1–3) a candidate drops from training in BRC.     
d. Reason Attrite 
Using the spreadsheets and counselling in aggregation, I determine why each 
candidate fails to graduate BRC. I then categorize these reasons and construct a variable 
(DROP_CODE) as listed in Table 12.   
Table 12.   Definitions of Variable DROP_CODE. 
DROP_CODE (assigned) Reason Explanation 
1 Academic Candidate failed to achieve 
the minimum score on a 
written test 
2 Admin Candidate failed to meet 
prerequisite criteria upon 
arrival to BRC 
3 Drop of Request (DOR) Candidate voluntarily  
withdraws from training 
4 PFT Candidate failed to achieve 
minimum PFT score 
5 Land navigation Candidate failed to achieve 
the minimum score on day 
and/or night land navigation 
6 Medical Candidate had a medical 
condition which prevented 
continuation of training 
7 Patrolling Candidate failed to achieve 
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DROP_CODE (assigned) Reason Explanation 
the minimum  score on 
graded patrols 
8 Fin Candidate failed to achieve 
the minimum score on open 
water surface  swims with 
fins and combat equipment 
9 Safety pool Candidate identified as a 
safety hazard while training 
in the pool and risk of 
further training deemed to 
high 
10 Swim qual Candidate failed to 
demonstrate the necessary 
skills to pass Water 
Survival Advanced as 
outlined in MCO 1500.52D 
11 Legal Candidate was subjected to 
legal action during training 
12 Unknown Unable to decipher reason 
for attrite with given data 
13 Individual skills test Candidate failed to achieve 
the minimum score on one 
of the individual skills test 
administered during the 
course 
14 Integrity Candidate demonstrated a 
lack of maturity and 
judgment during the 
duration of the course 
15 Knots test Candidate failed to achieve 
the minimum score to pass 
the knots test 
 
e. Number of Previous Attempts 
The number of previous attempts (numbr_prev_attmpts) depicts how many times 
a candidate attends BRC prior to the current attempt. Additionally, FY15 and FY16 data 
contains a variable to reflect how many attempts the candidate took to complete BRPC 
(num_brpc_attempts).   
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C. MERGING BRC AND TFDW DATA 
Once the data from TFDW and BRC is clean and variables constructed, I proceed 
to merge the datasets for further analyses. In order to merge the datasets, I use the 
candidate’s last name, first name, middle initial, SSN, and class. When I cannot match 
records using all five fields, I match on four fields: last name, first name, SSN, and class. 
Remaining unmatched observations are merged by last name and first name and class, 
and then subsequently by SSN and class if still unmatched. The match rate across Fiscal 
Years is 95 to 100 percent. Due to variances in the number of spaces and inputs in FY15 
datasets, for example, it is necessary to merge the data iteratively four times (starting with 
the finest coverage as outlined above and limiting to matching in 2 fields) in order to 
match over 95 percent of the observations. In FY16, the data sets from BRC do not 
include the candidate’s social security number. Instead, I complete the merge using the 
Department of Defense identification number (formerly referred to as the Electronic Data 
Interchange Personal Identifier [EDIPI]). 
D. OMITTED OBSERVATIONS 
Due to the observations with incomplete data points, potential exists for omitted 
variable bias. To solve this issue and analyze the complete dataset, I create dummy 
variables. To construct these variables I generate a dummy variable if the respective 
variable was a .”“ and replace it with a “0.”  This technique allows me to analyze all 
observations in the dataset with class fixed effects to account for unobservable variables 
specific to that class. Table 13 provides a description of the dummy variables. 
Table 13.   Definition of Dummy Variables 
Variable Name Variable Description 
x_GCT_GT_TOTAL =1 if missing GT score for enlisted, GCT score for commissioned officer 
x_AFQT_SCORE =1 if missing Armed Forces Qualification Test  
x_PFT_SCORE =1 if missing Physical Fitness Test (PFT) total score 
x_PFT_RUN_TM =1 if missing PFT run time 
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x_MANUF_TM =1 if missing CFT Maneuver time 
x_RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE =1 if missing Rifle Qualification Score 
x_COMBAT_DEP =1 if missing number of previous Combat Deployments 
x_BLACK =1 if missing race/ethnicity 
x_TIG =1 if missing time in current grade  
x_TIS =1 if missing time the candidate has been in the service 
x_OccFld =1 if missing Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS) 
x_MARR =1 if missing marital status 
x_HSonly =1 if missing education candidate obtained 
 
E. DATA STATISTICS 
1. Summary Statistics 
The total number of BRC candidates in this research thus consists of 1,577 
observations from FY2013 to FY2016. Each observation is a unique BRC candidate in 
that cohort within that fiscal year. Individual BRC candidates who fail out of one cohort 
and try again in a subsequent cohort could thus be the same Marine. Each observation in 
the data includes information for that candidate’s event scores while at BRC as well as 
data points (including demographics, evaluation marks, and test scores) captured in the 
month prior to beginning at BRC.   
Table 14 provides summary statistics of this data. Data for this analysis are 100 
percent male because this MOS was not open to women prior to FY2016. The overall 
graduation rate from FY2013 to FY2016 is 57 percent. BRC candidates during FY13-
FY16 are on average 22.5 years old and have a GT score of 118. Ninety three percent of 
the candidates are enlisted, 15.1 percent are Navy Corpsmen, and 70 percent originate 
from a combat arms occupational specialty. Twenty-four percent of the candidates 
previously attended an “advance” MOS school prior to BRC, and 13.5 percent complete 
combat deployments prior to attending BRC.  
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Table 14.   Data Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GRAD 57.2% .4949499 0 1 
GCT_GT_TOTAL 118.13 9.640125 87 148 
PFT_SCORE 283.10 15.45936 201 300 
CFT_SCORE 295.75 6.396117 243 300 
COMBAT_DEP 13.9% 0.667028 1 6 
AGE (years) 22.48 3.403562 18.16 34.68 
OccFld_Ground_Combat 70.4% 0.456858 0 1 
ENLISTED 93.1% 0.253402 0 1 
MARR 32.5% 0.468564 0 1 
PRO_CON 4.40 0.197555 4.0 5.0 
NAVY 15.1% 0.358552 0 1 
NO_ADVANCE_SCHOO
L 11.6% 0.750669 1 10 
 
2. Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 4 through Figure 14 illustrate the frequency and distribution of the 
continuous variables in this study.   
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Figure 4.  PRO_CON Distribution 
 
































15 20 25 30 35
AGE (years)
 48 
Figure 6.  GCT_GT_TOTAL Distribution  
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Figure 8.  TIG Distribution 
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Figure 10.  PFT_Score Distribution 
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Figure 12.  MANUF_TM Distribution  
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Figure 14.  COMBAT_DEP Distribution  
 
 
F. METHODOLOGY  
1. Multivariate Regression 
I use STATA version 13.1 throughout this research. Logistic regression is the first 
model I analyze in this research to identify which independent variables are statistically 
significant in predicting success at BRC.   Logistic regression is appropriate to use in this 
study because of the binary nature of the dependent variable (GRAD) reflecting 
graduation from BRC (GRAD=1) or attrition (GRAD=0). I examine 27 independent 
variables in the logistic regression. The following equation represents the logistic 
regression I estimate in this study: 






















𝑧 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑃𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝑏2𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝑏3𝐺𝐶𝑇𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 + 𝑏4𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑂𝑁 + 𝑏5𝑇𝐼𝐺
+ 𝑏6𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝑏7𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅 + 𝑏8𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑃 + 𝑏9𝑆𝑜𝑚𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙
+ 𝑏10𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣_𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑠 
𝑏0= the intercept or constant term 
𝑏1= change in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in physical 
ability as measured by the PFT (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏2= change in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in rifle 
qualification score (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏3= change in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in cognitive 
ability as measured by the GT score (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏4= change in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in 
proficiency and conduct score (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏5= changes in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in time in 
current grade at convene date of BRC (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏6= changes in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in age at 
convene date of BRC (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏7= change in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in marital 
status of candidate (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏8= change in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in number of 
combat deployments (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏9= change in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in having 
some post high school education at completing BRC (holding all other variables constant) 
𝑏10= change in likelihood of graduating BRC associated with change in number 
of previous attempts at completing BRC (holding all other variables constant) 
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2. Survival Model 
In addition to the logit model, this research uses survival analysis to examine the 
uncensored observations, or those candidates who fail to graduate. Knowing that the time 
to complete BRC is 65 training days, I construct a duration variable and let T_Day=65 for 
candidates who do graduate while for those who do not graduate, T_Day<65 reflects the 
training day that the candidate attrits. Thus, T_Day reflects the length of time candidates 
survive at BRC, censored at 65 days.   
The goal in this research is to construct a predictive model of survival to 
graduation in BRC, and in particular, to identify the variables that are statistically 
significant in describing this relationship. The following equation represents this 
relationship, where h(.) indicates the hazard rate at training day t:  
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥) = ℎ0(t)e 
(𝑥𝛽𝑥) 
Survival analysis methods differ from logit regressions by assessing a hazard rate (at time 
t given x covariates, the probability of attriting in the next instant given they have 
survived up to time t) instead of an absolute proportion (proportion of BRC candidates 
who survive and graduate over the entire period). To estimate this model, I use the Cox 
proportional hazards regression model, which allows me to estimate the probability of 
survival as a function of the candidate’s characteristics or covariates x (Cleves, Gould 
&Gutierrez, 2004).  
In STATA 13.1, I implement survival analysis by fitting the Cox model and then 
using the command “stcurve” to plot the survivor curve of a given observation when 
holding variables constant. Additionally, I use the hazard and cumulative hazard, H(t), 
commands to estimate the hazardous contributions against the established baseline. This 
method is appropriate for establishing a fitted model to display the survival probability 
based on the independent variables inputted into the model (Cleves, Gould, &Gutierrez, 
2004).   
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From the data I know that every candidate began assessing into BRC on training 
day zero (T-Day=0) and graduation is on training day 65 (T_Day=65). The data also 
annotates which day a given candidate attrits from BRC. In their book, Introduction to 
Survival Analysis Using Stata, Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez recommend the following 
hazard regression rate for the jth subject     
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑗) = ℎ0(𝑡)e
𝑥𝑗𝛽𝑥 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
In summary, this chapter provides insight into the variables models I use in this 
research. I review the methods to clean and merge the data in order to prepare the data for 
estimating statistical models in Stata 13.1. The chapter also outlines the construction of 
the dependent, independent, and dummy variables. Finally, I construct the logistic 
regression models and survival model estimated in the next chapter. 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Chapter V presents the findings from estimating the multivariate logistic model 
and survival model. The first section discusses the multivariate logistic model and 
associated findings. The second section discusses the survival model and analyses of the 
findings. 
A. MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
The results suggest that PFT score, GT score, and completing at least one 
semester of college (some_coll) are significant predictors of success at BRC. In 
particular, PFT score is associated with nearly one percent increase in probability of 
graduation for every one-point increase in PFT score. GT score is associated with nearly 
one percent increase in probability of graduation for every one-point increase in GT 
score. Finally, having completed at least one semester of college is associated with an 
20.5 percent increase in the probability of graduating BRC.   
1.  Logistic Regression Model 
First, I report estimates from the full logit model as described in Chapter IV 
where I include all continuous variables to examine the probability of graduating BRC 
during the period FY13-FY16. This is my preferred specification of these continuous 
variables because alternatives did not lead to results that were easy to interpret. For 
instance, I control for individual ASVAB sub-test scores, but these components are 
highly collinear with each other and with the GT/GCT scores. 
Table 15 reports the marginal effects from this logistic regression. These are not 
the coefficients b outlined in the previous chapter, but rather the effect of a unit-change in 






Table 15.   Logistic Multivariate Regression MFX Results 
Model 1 Results 
 GRAD P>|z| 
VARIABLES mfx dydx  
PFT_SCORE 0.0015*** 0.000 
 (0.0003)  
RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE_CD -0.0009* 0.053 
 (0.0005)  
GCT_GT_TOTAL 0.0007 0.539 
 (0.0011)  
PRO_CON -0.0298* 0.091 
 (0.0177)  
TIG 0.0043** 0.023 
 (0.0019)  
AGE 0.0038 0.405 
 (0.0045)  
MARR 0.0817** 0.031 
 (0.0379)  
COMBAT_DEP -0.0998*** 0.000 
 (0.0273)  
Some_College 0.1172** 0.049 
 (0.0595)  
number_prev_attmpts 0.0826*** 0.002 
 (0.0267)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Observations 1,576 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0473 
     
 
Next, I discuss the results for each individual covariate. 
a. PFT Score  




=.0015, P>0.00). Although the marginal effect is statistically significant, 
the magnitude suggests that a ten point increase in PFT score increases the probability of 
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graduation by 2.6 percent (.0015/.5719721=.00262251) , holding all other variables 
constant.    
b. Rifle Score 
Rifle score is not highly predictive of success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐿𝐸_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸
= [-] 0.0009, 
P>0.053). The p-value is just outside the margin of significance of α= 0.05. 
c. GT Score  




= .0007, P>0.539). The p-value is outside the margin of significance of α= 
0.05. However, after examining Figure 4 (distribution of GT scores), I conclude that the 
lack of significance is from lack of variation in the data. The prerequisite score to assess 
into the reconnaissance MOS are from the top tier of prospective candidates, and so in 
later analyses, I will re-specify this measure of cognitive ability.   
d. Proficiency and Conduct Score 




= [-].0298, P>0.091). The p-value is outside the margin of significance of 
α= 0.05. 
e. Time In Grade (TIG) 




 = .0043, P>0.023). The results suggest that increasing the time in grade by 
six months increases the probability of graduating BRC by 4.5 percent, holding all other 
variables constant.    
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f. Age 
According to the results of the model, a candidate’s age is not significant in 
predicting success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝐴𝐺𝐸
 =.0038, P>.405). The p-value is outside the 
margin of significance of α= 0.05. 
g. Marital Status 




 = .0817, P>0.031). The results suggest that if a candidate is married the 
probability of graduating BRC increases by 0.1428 or 14.3 percent, holding all other 
variables constant.   
h. Combat Deployments 
The number of combat deployments is statistically significant, but the sign of the 
coefficient is negative (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑇_𝐷𝐸𝑃
= [-] .0998, P>0.000). I control for age and all other 
constants, yet a candidate with one more combat deployment is less likely to graduate. I 
hypothesize combat deployments is negatively correlated with mental health or 
resiliency, and if resiliency is positively correlated with graduation, the omitted variable 
bias results in the negative coefficient.      
i. Post High School Education 




= .1172, P>0.049). The independent variable is a categorical variable; 
therefore, the probability of graduating BRC increases 20.5 percent if a prospective 
candidate has taken some college courses prior to attending BRC, holding all other 
variables constant.   
j. Number of Previous Attempts at BRC 
The number of times a candidate has attempted BRC is statistically significant in 
predicting success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑠
= .0826, P>0.002). The results of the 
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model suggest that every previous attempt at BRC increases the likelihood of graduating 
BRC by 14.4 percent, holding all other variables constant.   
2. Logistic Regression Model with Current Prerequisites 
The next model I estimate instead takes into account current prerequisites for 
assessing into BRC rather than the continuous measures used in the previous section. I 
create categorical variables for PFT score and GT score that reflect thresholds for 
eligibility. Table 16 presents the results. 
Table 16.   Logistic Multivariate Regression Results 
Model 2 Results 
VARIABLES GRAD P>|z| 
 mfx dydx  
PFT_gt225 0.3645*** 0.000 
 (0.0727)  
RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE_CD -0.0001 0.771 
 (0.0005)  
GCT_GT_TOTAL_gt105 -0.2161** 0.049 
 (0.1099)  
PRO_CON -0.0177 0.311 
 (0.0174)  
TIG 0.0041** 0.030 
 (0.0019)  
AGE 0.0066 0.142 
 (0.0045)  
MARR 0.0618 0.105 
 (0.0381)  
COMBAT_DEP -0.1016*** 0.000 
 (0.0273)  
Some_Coll 0.1449** 0.012 
 (0.0575)  
number_prev_attmpts 0.0801*** 0.003 
 (0.0266)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Observations 1,576 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0446 
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a. PFT Score  
At the eligibility threshold margin, having a PFT score higher than 225 is 
positively predictive of success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝑃𝐹𝑇_𝑔𝑡225
= .3645, P>0.00). In this model, 
PFT_gt225 is a categorical independent variable equal to “1” if the candidate has a score 
higher than 225 and “0” otherwise. Given over 98 percent of candidates possess a PFT 
score higher than 225 prior to attending BRC, it makes sense that this categorical variable 
is significant.      
b. Rifle Score 
Rifle score is not predictive of success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐿𝐸 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸
= [-] 0.0001, 
P>0.771). The p-value is outside the margin of significance of α= 0.05. 
c. GT Score  




= [-].2161, P>0.049). Examining the data, I find that over 95 percent of 
candidates possess a GT score higher than 105 with a mean score of 118.31 and standard 
deviation of 9.64, but the results are heavily skewed (Figure 4). Since the current 
graduation rate is approximately 57 percent, the sign of this coefficient is negative.   
d. Proficiency and Conduct Score 




= [-].0177, P>0.311). The p-value is outside the margin of significance of 
α= 0.05. 
e. Time In Grade (TIG) 




 = .0041, P>0.030). The results suggest that increasing the time in grade by 
six months increases the probability of graduating BRC by 4.3 percent, holding all other 
variables constant.    
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f. Age 
According to the results of the model, a candidate’s age is not significant in 
predicting success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝐴𝐺𝐸
=.0066, P>.142). The p-value is outside the 
margin of significance of α= 0.05. 
g. Marital Status 




= .0618, P>0.105). The p-value is just the margin of significance of α= 
0.05. 
h. Combat Deployments 
The number of combat deployments is statistically significant, but the sign of the 
co-efficient is negative (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑇_𝐷𝐸𝑃
= [-] .1016, P>0.000). I control for age and all 
other constants, yet a candidate with one more combat deployment is less likely to 
graduate. I hypothesize combat deployments is negatively correlated with mental health 
or resiliency, and if resiliency is positively correlated with graduation, the omitted 
variable bias results in the negative coefficient. 
i. Post High School Education 




= .1449, P>0.012). The independent variable is a categorical variable; 
therefore, the probability of graduating BRC increases 25.3 percent if a prospective 
candidate has taken some college courses prior to attending BRC, holding all other 
variables constant.   
j. Number of Previous Attempts at BRC 
The number of times a candidate has attempted BRC is statistically significant in 
predicting success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑠
= .0801, P>0.003). The results of the 
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model suggest that every previous attempt at BRC increases the likelihood of graduating 
BRC by 14 percent, holding all other variables constant. 
3. Logistic Regression Model with Increased Prerequisites 
Next, I examine the marginal effects to see if increasing prerequisite thresholds is 
associated with greater chances of success. I estimate various such thresholds, and Table 
17 below reports my preferred model. 
Table 17.   Logistic Multivariate Regression MFX Results 
Model 3 Results 
VARIABLES GRAD P>|z| 
 mfx dxdy  
PFT_gt275 0.1598*** 0.000 
 (0.0333)  
RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE_CD -0.0001 0.848 
 (0.0003)  
GCT_GT_TOTAL_gt115 0.1017*** 0.000 
 (0.0292)  
PRO_CON -0.0243 0.149 
 (0.0169)  
TIG 0.0044** 0.019 
 (0.0019)  
AGE 0.005 0.244 
 (0.0043)  
MARR 0.0684* 0.067 
 (0.0374)  
COMBAT_DEP -0.0908*** 0.001 
 (0.0273)  
x_some_coll 0.0951 0.119 
 (0.061)  
number_prev_attmpts 0.0910*** 0.001 
 (0.0267)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Observations 1,576 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0487 
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a. PFT Score  
At the margin, having a PFT score higher than 275 is positively predictive of 
success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝑃𝐹𝑇_𝑔𝑡275
= .1598, P>0.00). In this model, PFT_gt275 is a 
categorical independent variable increasing the probability of graduating from BRC by 
28 percent.   
b. Rifle Score 
Rifle score is not predictive of success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐿𝐸 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸
= [-] 0.0001, 
P>0.848). The p-value is outside the margin of significance of α= 0.05. 
c. GT Score  




= .1017, P>0.000). The results of the model suggest that requiring a GT 
score of 115 increases the probability of graduating from BRC by 17.8 percent, holding 
all other variables constant.   
d. Proficiency and Conduct Score 




= [-].0243, P>0.149). The p-value is the margin of significance of α= 0.05. 
e. Time In Grade (TIG) 




 = .0044, P>0.019). The results suggest that increasing the time in grade by 
six months increases the probability of graduating BRC by 4.6 percent, holding all other 
variables constant.    
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f. Age 
According to the results of the model, a candidate’s age is not significant in 
predicting success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝐴𝐺𝐸
 =.005, P>.244). The p-value is outside the 
margin of significance of α= 0.05. 
g. Marital Status 




= .0684, P>0.067). The p-value is just outside the margin of significance 
of α= 0.05. 
h. Combat Deployments 
The number of combat deployments is statistically significant, but the sign of the 
co-efficient is negative (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑇_𝐷𝐸𝑃
= [-] .0908, P>0.001). I control for age and all 
other constants, yet a candidate with one more combat deployment is less likely to 
graduate. I hypothesize combat deployments is negatively correlated with mental health 
or resiliency, and if resiliency is positively correlated with graduation, the omitted 
variable bias results in the negative coefficient. 
i. Post High School Education 




= .0951, P>0.119). The p-value is outside the margin of significance 
of α= 0.05.   
j. Number of Previous Attempts at BRC 
The number of times a candidate has attempted BRC is statistically significant in 
predicting success at BRC (
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷=1)
𝜕𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑠
= .0910, P>0.001). The results of the 
model suggest that every previous attempt at BRC increases the likelihood of graduating 
BRC by 15.9 percent, holding all other variables constant. 
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4.  Logistic Regression with Cohort Fixed Effects 
After analyzing the first model, I decide to use the logistic regression model with 
cohort fixed effects (FE). Adding cohort FE allows the regression to eliminate much of 
the bias that originates from variation within cohorts. Variation may result from 
unobserved differences in demographic characteristics of a particular cohort. There is 
variation across cohorts in the proportions of non-Marine BRC candidates, which induces 
cohort differences in lack of data points for candidates. Cohort FE also controls for the 
differences in unobserved qualities across cohorts. Some of the unobserved qualities may 
be the result of peer effects, seasonal changes, instructor cadre turnover, and changes in 
recruitment just to name a few. The following equation was estimated incorporating 
cohort FEs: 
Pr (𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐 = 1) =
𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐹𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝒊𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑇 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝐶 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐿𝐸_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝐶 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑇_𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝐶 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝐶 + 𝛽6𝑇𝐼𝐺𝑖𝐶 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝐶 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑅𝑂_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝐶 +
𝛽9𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙 +  𝛽10𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣_𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑖𝐶 + 𝑎𝐶)     
where i = an individual candidate, c = the class and F (.) is the logistic regression function 
described in the previous chapter. The independent variables remain the same as previous 
models. Table 18 illustrates the results. 
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Table 18.   Logistic Regression MFX Results with Cohort FE  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 FE Model 
VARIABLES GRAD GRAD GRAD GRAD 
  mfx dydx mfx dydx mfx dydx mfx dydx 
PFT_SCORE 0.0015***     0.0014*** 
  (0.0003)     (0.0003) 
PFT_gt225   0.3645***   0.3517*** 
    (0.0727)   (0.0816) 
PFT_gt275     0.1598*** 0.1659*** 
      (0.0333) (0.0365) 
RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE_CD -0.0009* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0014*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
GCT_GT_TOTAL 0.0007     0.0019 
  (0.0011)     (0.0012) 
GCT_GT_TOTAL_gt105   -0.2161**   -0.1736 
    (0.1099)   (0.1215) 
GCT_GT_TOTAL_gt115     0.1017*** 0.1434*** 
      (0.0292) (0.0311) 
PRO_CON -0.0298* -0.0177 -0.0243 -0.0296 
  (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0169) (0.0187) 
TIG 0.0043** 0.0041** 0.0044** 0.0036* 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.002) 
AGE 0.0038 0.0066 0.005 0.0015 
  (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0047) 
MARR 0.0817** 0.0618 0.0684* 0.0719* 
  (0.0379) (0.0381) (0.0374) (0.0404) 
COMBAT_DEP -0.0998*** -0.1016*** -0.0908*** -0.0507* 
  (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0287) 
x_some_coll 0.1172** 0.1449** 0.0951 0.1198* 
  (0.0595) (0.0575) (0.061) (0.0616) 
number_prev_attmpts 0.0826*** 0.0801*** 0.0910*** 0.1270*** 
  (0.0267) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0294) 
Fixed Effects  No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Observations 1,576 1,576 1,576 1,576 
Pseudo R2 0.0473 0.0446 0.0487 0.1501 
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5. Summary  
The results provide estimates that show which variables are predictive of success 
at BRC, as measured by the probability of graduating BRC (dependent variable). The 
findings summarized below may prove helpful in determining what prerequisites require 
further evaluation.   
First, PFT score is highly predictive of success at BRC. This is not surprising in 
isolation due to the highly demanding physical requirements of BRC. The findings 
suggest that raising the current PFT score threshold eligibility of 225 can increase the 
probability of graduating. Second, cognitive skills are also predictive of success at BRC. 
While the continuous variable of GT score is predictive, the magnitude is not 
economically significant. When the GT score threshold adjusts to 115, however, it 
becomes statistically significant and economically meaningful. Table 19 reports the 
predictive effects at the margins of adjusting the required PFT and GT score for 
recruitment of candidates. The goal is to find the optimal prerequisites while maintaining 
the force structure to meet manpower requirements.  
As expected, the number of previous attempts is highly predictive of a candidate’s 
probability of graduating. However, this indicator does not represent an efficient or 
economical characteristic for recruiting and selecting the best candidates. The evaluation 
of a given BRC candidate’s reaction to a given scenario at first exposure provides a 
crucial and unbiased assessment of the candidate. Repeated exposure(s) to an event 
reduces the effectiveness of the test as a measurement of the candidate’s potential in the 
operating forces.   
Overall, a candidate with an education level beyond high school has a higher 
probability of graduating BRC. Again, this is a reflection of cognitive ability and critical 
thinking skills obtained at higher education institutions. These skills may be beneficial, 
especially in activities that test the candidate’s ability to problem solve –such as land 
navigation. The Marine Corps should seek to focus recruitment and selection of 
candidates that possess higher bundles of both cognitive ability and physical ability.   
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Table 19.   Predictive Margins Results for PFT and GT Score  
Predictive margins Expression   : Pr(GRAD), predict() 
Delta-method Number of obs= 1,576 
_at  Margin  Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Inter] 
PFT_SCORE 
=225 GT = 105 0.5833476 0.0130502 44.7 0 0.5577696 0.6089256 
PFT_SCORE 
=225 GT = 110 0.5864282 0.0153992 38.08 0 0.5562463 0.6166101 
PFT_SCORE 
=225 GT = 115 0.5895035 0.018747 31.45 0 0.55276 0.626247 
PFT_SCORE 
=225 GT = 120 0.5925734 0.0226437 26.17 0 0.5481926 0.6369541 
PFT_SCORE 
=225 GT =125 0.5956375 0.0268408 22.19 0 0.5430306 0.6482445 
PFT_SCORE 
=225 GT = 130 0.5986958 0.0312078 19.18 0 0.5375296 0.659862 
PFT_SCORE 
=250 GT = 105 0.6177694 0.0122006 50.63 0 0.5938567 0.641682 
PFT_SCORE 
=250 GT = 110 0.6207781 0.0138812 44.72 0 0.5935715 0.6479847 
PFT_SCORE 
=250 GT = 115 0.6237792 0.0167898 37.15 0 0.5908717 0.6566867 
PFT_SCORE 
=250 GT = 120 0.6267723 0.0203904 30.74 0 0.5868079 0.6667367 
PFT_SCORE 
=250 GT = 125 0.6297574 0.0243626 25.85 0 0.5820076 0.6775072 
PFT_SCORE 
=250 GT = 130 0.6327342 0.0285379 22.17 0 0.5768009 0.6886675 
PFT_SCORE 
=275 GT = 105 0.6512417 0.0142722 45.63 0 0.6232687 0.6792146 
PFT_SCORE 
=275 GT = 110 0.654152 0.0150591 43.44 0 0.6246366 0.6836674 
PFT_SCORE 
=275 GT = 115 0.6570524 0.0171022 38.42 0 0.6235327 0.6905721 
PFT_SCORE 
=275 GT = 120 0.6599427 0.0199982 33 0 0.6207469 0.6991385 
PFT_SCORE 
=275 GT = 125 0.6628227 0.0234135 28.31 0 0.6169331 0.7087123 
PFT_SCORE 
=275 GT = 130 0.6656923 0.0271354 24.53 0 0.6125078 0.7188767 
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B. SURVIVAL MODEL 
Next, I use survival and duration analysis to assess empirically if a given 
candidate does attrite from BRC, what event (time) does failure occur and what data 
correlates with that candidate’s duration of survival at BRC. First, I determine at what 
time and for what reason candidates attrite from BRC. Table 20 summarizes the reasons 
or events candidates attrite. The significant extracts are DOR, which accounts for 27.08 
percent of all candidates that attrite; land navigation, swim qualification, patrolling, and 
medical reasons are the other major contributing reasons for attrition.   Table 21 depicts 
what days during the training cycle that candidates are likely to attrite. Of significance 
are T-Day 10 (land navigation), T-Day 15 (swim qualification), T-Day 53 and 55 
(patrolling).   
Table 20.   Percentages of Attrition by Drop Code  
DROP_CODE Freq. Percent 
Academic (code-1) 13 2.12% 
Administrative (code-2) 4 0.65% 
DOR (code-3) 166 27.08% 
PFT (code-4) 38 6.20% 
Land Navigation (code-5) 86 14.03% 
Medical (code-6) 106 17.29% 
Patrolling (code-7) 46 7.50% 
Fin Time Failure (code-8) 18 2.94% 
Safety concern in pool (code-9) 25 4.08% 
Swim Qual (code-10) 65 10.60% 
Legal (code-11) 2 0.33% 
Individual Skills Test (code-13) 3 0.49% 
Integrity (code-14) 19 3.10% 
Knots Test (code-15) 22 3.59% 




Table 21.   Percentages of Attrition by Training Day 
T_Day Freq. Percent 
0 94 13.93% 
1 32 4.74% 
2 26 3.85% 
3 26 3.85% 
4 19 2.81% 
5 14 2.07% 
6 25 3.70% 
7 14 2.07% 
8 14 2.07% 
9 8 1.19% 
10 100 14.81% 
11 8 1.19% 
12 13 1.93% 
13 21 3.11% 
14 24 3.56% 
15 48 7.11% 
16 24 3.56% 
17 12 1.78% 
18 7 1.04% 
21 5 0.74% 
22 1 0.15% 
23 2 0.30% 
26 3 0.44% 
27 22 3.26% 
28 3 0.44% 
29 1 0.15% 
30 7 1.04% 
31 11 1.63% 
32 3 0.44% 
33 2 0.30% 
34 2 0.30% 
36 1 0.15% 
37 2 0.30% 
38 3 0.44% 
39 1 0.15% 
40 2 0.30% 
41 5 0.74% 
42 4 0.59% 
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T_Day Freq. Percent 
44 4 0.59% 
45 10 1.48% 
49 1 0.15% 
50 2 0.30% 
53 21 3.11% 
54 2 0.30% 
55 26 3.85% 
Total 675 100.00% 
 
Figure 15 through Figure 20 present the results of the survival models based on 
the comparison of three independent variables (PFT, GT, and some college). Overall, the 
results illustrate a significant, steep drop in survivability on T-Day 10. This makes sense 
since land navigation is both a cognitively and physically challenging evaluation. Land 
navigation requires the candidate to not only use cognitive skills to problem solve, but 
also requires the candidates to move over terrain, under load, while problem solving.     








distance_PFT225 0.988433 0.002302 0.000 0.983931 0.992956 
RIFLE_QUAL_SCORE 1.001138 0.00119 0.339 0.998809 1.003472 
distance_GT105 0.980737 0.005461 0.000 0.970092 0.991499 
PRO_CON 1.106202 0.065391 0.088 0.985184 1.242085 
TIG 0.988333 0.006544 0.076 0.975591 1.001242 
AGE 0.977133 0.014236 0.112 0.949625 1.005438 
MARR 0.813985 0.109835 0.127 0.624827 1.060409 
COMBAT_DEP 1.288728 0.113272 0.004 1.084789 1.531007 
Some_Coll 0.902474 0.204144 0.650 0.57928 1.405985 
number_prev_attmpts 0.778788 0.069235 0.005 0.654255 0.927025 
 
6. PFT Score 
Physical fitness is significant in predicting success at BRC. Figure 15 and Figure 
16 illustrate the significant role of PFT score in predicting the success of a given 
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candidate. The graphs plot TD survival rates (proportion who survive to the next T-Day 
given survival up to each T-Day) and smoothed hazard rates (attrition at each T-Day) for 
25-point incremental increase in PFT score, holding all other variables constant. The 
lower bound is the minimum PFT (225) and the upper bound is a perfect PFT score 
(300). The model suggests there is a significant increase in the probability of a given 
candidate’s success at each training day with an increase in PFT score holding all other 
variables constant. On the first and even second day of the training cycle, Figure 15 
shows differences in the effect of 25-point incremental increases in PFT scores on 
survival to the next training day are little to none. These differences become apparent by 
TD 3 and magnify over the training cycle. Note that the proportionality in the differences 
in survival rate across the 25-point incremental changes in PFT is an assumption of the 
Cox proportional hazards model.      
Table 22 lists the estimates of the survival model that underlie the graphs. 
Interpretation of these hazard ratios highlights the effect of predicting success with 
changes in the required PFT during recruitment. The hazard ratio states that for PFT 
score above 225, a one point increase in the PFT score increases the probability of 
graduation by nearly one percent (100%-98.843%) holding all other variables constant.   
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Figure 15.  PFT Score Survival Analysis Results 
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7. GT Score 
The results suggest that cognitive ability is second to physical attributes when 
predicting success at BRC, but is also statistically significant. Similar to Figures 15 and 
16, Figures 17 and 18 illustrates the significant role of GT score in predicting the success 
of a given candidate. The graph represents the survival and hazard rates of a given 
candidate holding all other variables constant with a 10-point incremental increase in GT 
score from the minimum score of 105. The lower bound is the minimum GT score (105) 
and the upper bound is a GT score of 135. The model suggests there is a significant 
increase in the probability of a given candidate to survive each training day with an 
increase in GT score holding all other variables constant.   
Using the results in Table 22, I conclude changes that increase GT score, holding 
all other variables constant, positively affects the survival probability of a given 
candidate at BRC. The hazard ratio states that for GT score above 105, a one point 
increase in the GT score increases the probability of graduating by about two percent 
(100%-98.073%) holding all other variables constant.   
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Figure 18.  GT Score Hazard Analysis Results 
 
 
8. Previous Attempts 
  Figure 19 illustrates the impact of having attempted BRC previously.   The graph 
represents the survivability of a given candidate holding all other variables constant with 
an incremental increase of one previous attempt. The lower bound is zero previous 
attempts and the upper bound reflects a candidate with four previous attempts. The model 
suggests there is a significant increase in the probability of a given candidate graduating 
with an increase in previous attempts, holding all other variables constant. However, as 
the candidate progresses through the course and enters phase three of BRC, the 
probability of survival nearly converges. This finding suggests there is minimal 
difference (less than 2 percent) in the probability of graduating based on the hazard of 
previous attempts of candidates in phase three, suggesting that any competitive edge of 
prior BRC attempts dissipate over time. 
Using the results in Figure 20, I conclude that a candidate with previous attempts 
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candidate graduating BRC. The hazard ratio states that for candidates with previous 
attempts, the probability of graduating increases by 22 percent (100%-77.88), holding all 
other variables constant.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of my research is to provide quantitative evidence identifying the 
candidate’s characteristics, if any, that are significantly predictive of successful 
completion of the MOS school for the reconnaissance Marine, BRC. Selecting the right 
candidate is not only beneficial by efficiently allocating training resources and increasing 
graduation rates, but the true measure of benefit is in the effectiveness of any given 
graduate of BRC forward-deployed in the operational forces. With historically high 
attrition rates and the constant threat of constrained resources, the results of this research 
provide a foundation for policy makers to improve the selection process of candidates.   
For my research, I conduct multivariate logistic regression models and the Cox 
survival model. The research highlights at least three statistically significant variables 
that, if adjusted, provide significant magnitude of impact on increasing the accession rate 
at BRC.   
First, I find that PFT score is a good predictive indicator of potential success at 
BRC. There is evidence that supports increasing the minimum requirement for PFT score 
will yield immediate increases in the graduation rate at BRC. 
The second finding suggests that a combination of cognitive ability and physical 
attributes are necessary to complete the arduous and demanding BRC curriculum. GT 
score measures the Cognitive ability for selection to MOS producing schools for enlisted 
Marines. The results, and other research reviewed in Chapter III, suggest that raising the 
minimum threshold for GT score will also positively affect the probability of a given 
candidate graduating BRC.   
The third finding reinforces the concept that continual exposure to a scenario will 
increase the probability of successfully completing the event. However, the Marine Corps 
must maintain a balance with the realization that repeat exposures to a certain event 
degrades the effectiveness of measuring and evaluating a candidate’s potential for 
success as a reconnaissance Marine. Furthermore, the extended resources used to 
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continue to train a candidate may be more effectively allocated and requirement to retrain 
reduced by recruiting the “right Marine” for the job with the correct prerequisites.   
Finally, the survival analysis provides insight into how each independent variable 
will affect the retention rate over the course of 65 training days. The results confirm the 
statistically significant independent variables and inform commanders that adjusting 
particular variables will achieve the desired end-state. The results of this research provide 
commanders with many different courses of action, including predicted candidate 
survival rates at various eligibility thresholds on the PFT and GT tests.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
1. Swim Qualification 
Currently the prerequisite for selection to attend BRC is WSB+ (Figure 3). This 
standard for BRC is the same standard for graduating Marine Corps Recruit Training. 
Maintaining this standard is not effective in discerning which candidate will pass the 
significant hazard at T-Day 15 (swim qualification). With an attrition rate of 15 percent 
on T-Day 15, there is significant concern the right candidates are not being recruited. 
This lack of confidence and ability in the water may potentially spill over into the 
amphibious operations in the open-ocean environment and present a significant hazard. 
Further research should determine if there is a better prerequisite that can separate the 
population and only recruit those candidates with the highest probability of successfully 
completing BRC.   
2. Maintaining Data 
This research would not have been possible without the data collected from BRC 
and TFDW. A limitation of this study is the amount of missing and uncollected 
information. Improvements in collecting and compiling systematic data will be vital 
going forward as commanders throughout DOD determine policies based on analysis of 
accurate data. For instance, TFDW interfacing with MCTIMS is essential. Identifying 
what data is relevant and ensuring accurate collection of it is essential. Evidence-based 
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policymaking is only as good as the data collected. There is room for improvement in this 
study with data that has more fidelity.   
3. Effects of Reconnaissance Contracts on Recruiting  
The Marine Corps has been using guaranteed reconnaissance contracts over the 
past few years as an incentive to enlist Marines. With high attrition rates, it is inevitable 
that a significant portion of these guaranteed contracts do not graduate BRC. An analysis 
of the performance of these Marines after attriting from BRC will provide commanders 
with the measurable impact of this contract incentive. For this future research, it may 
prove beneficial to track the performance of these Marines as they pursue other 
occupational specialties within the Marine Corps. 
4. Predicting Success Beyond BRC 
In the triad of recruiting-training-retaining, expanding on this research and 
examining the performance of BRC graduates in the operating forces may further expand 
the knowledge base on recruiting the “right Marine” for the job. Examining in depth the 
attributes and characteristics that are predictive of successful performance and retention 
of the MOS will allow for examination of talent management in the Marine Corps beyond 
initial exposure.   
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